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CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMMING ON CABLE
TELEVISION'S PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS: THE
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
On the question of the right to photograph there is as yet very little judicial
opinion. Clearly, every one who sees fit may make pictures of natural
scenery. ... We think that no photograph exposing others to scorn,
disgrace, or contempt would be tolerated.'
One-hundred years ago, during photography's infancy, this was one com-
mentator's opinion as to the permissibiltiy of taking "controversial" photo-
graphs. Today, such a position would clearly be contrary to the notions of
permissible photography as practiced by photo-journalists, encouraged by
society, and protected by the first amendment. However, while photography
escaped extensive regulation, many other modes or media of expression have
not fared as well. Early societal and legal restrictions on media often have
become permanently entrenched and accepted. When society becomes disil-
lusioned with or ignorant of the capabilities of the new mode or medium of
expression it often reacts by imposing restrictions. Moie often such restric-
tions are the product of the politically powerful attempting to maintain or
increase their power and control over society. By setting the ground rules
for the new outlet of expression, and by appealing to the majority's fun-
damental intolerance of the minority, the powerful ensure the continued
access of those with whom they agree while freezing out any opponents.
Fortunately, as was the case with photography, many such knee-jerk res-
trictions are detected early and remedied so as to fuel the free flow of
expression.
One new medium of expression suffering through these early growing
pains is cable television's public access channels.2 Public access channels
offer citizens the unprecedented opportunity to express themselves over the
powerful medium of television-free from the control of the government or
media conglomerates. Public access channels are the electronic soap box of
the next-soon to be current-communication age. However, due to disap-
pointment with some of the programming appearing on public access, local
governments, cable companies, and even individual cable television subscri-
bers are attempting to restrict material presented on these channels. These
restrictions could have deleterious effects on the future uninhibited use of
1. ScrENTrc AmnucAN, Apr. 1889.
2. For a description of public access channels see infra notes 52-100 and accompanying
text.
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the medium. The disappointment stems from the cablecasting of controversial
programming or programming produced by unpopular groups.' To date,
public access programming produced by white supremacists has caused the
most furor.4
The goal of this Comment is to critique the various governmental responses
to controversial programming on public access channels. Local communities
have attempted to control controversial programming through the application
of two techniques: counter-programming and scheduling. Both methods are
intended to diminish the impact of the controversial message and are imple-
mented based solely on the content of the program. Therefore, such restric-
tions implicate the first amendment and must be scrutinized in accordance
with the amendment's precepts.
The background section of this Comment will review the history and
development of the cable television industry in general and access channels
in particular. This Comment will then examine the Federal Communications
Commission's ("F.C.C.") regulation of cable television, focusing primarily
on the F.C.C.'s regulation of public access channels from the late 1960's
until the late 1970's. Next, the background section will analyze the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, the current framework under which
local communities control cable television and public access channels. Finally,
the background section will conclude with a description of some of the
controversial programming at issue, the circumstances under which such
programming has been submitted, and the various responses of local gov-
ernments, cable companies, and local citizens.
The analysis section will examine the treatment controversial speech re-
ceives under the first amendment. This Comment will then explore the
appropriate level of governmental intrusion on public access programming
by applying a public forum doctrine analysis and analyzing a state action
problem associated with public access channels managed by non-profit cor-
porations. Lastly, this Comment will critique the use of counter-programming
and scheduling as responses to controversial programming on public access
channels. This comment concludes that counter-programming and schedul-
ing, as presently practiced, are impermissible because such techniques are
contrary to the traditional first-come, first-served public access environment,
contravene the purpose of public access as set out by Congress, and violate
the first amendment under current public forum doctrine analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Cable Industry
The first cable television systems in the United States were constructed in
the late 1940's. These early cable systems were known as community antenna
3. See infra notes 231-52 and accompanying text.
4. See id.
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television ("CATV") systems, reflecting the fact that they only retransmitted
broadcast signals.' The location of the first CATV system is "shrouded in
the same definitional haze which has obscured the origins of most 'firsts' in
broadcast innovation."' 6 Cities in Oregon and Pennsylvania claim to have
been the location of the first CATV system in the United States. A local
radio station operator in Astoria, Oregon, is often credited with constructing
the first noncommercial CATV system in 1949. 7 By other accounts, a line
serviceman for a utility company who, in 1948, constructed a CATV system
in Mahonoy City, Pennsylvania, is the rightful "father of cable television.",
However, the first CATV system specifically designed to earn a profit, and
usually credited with launching CATV was located in Lansford, Pennsyl-
vania.9
Jerrold Electronic Corporation, an equipment manufacturer, planned the
Lansford CATV system in October 1949, finished construction by early 1950
and, thereafter, began service as a profit-making venture.'0 In these early
systems, a CATV subscriber would pay approximately $100 for the instal-
lation of the cable and approximately $5 per month for service.II The industry
grew rapidly and by 1955, there were 400 CATV systems serving 150,000
subscribers.' 2
5. Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 979 n.l (D.R.I. 1983)
(cable television refers to systems capable of retransmitting television broadcast signals); Miller
& Beals, Regulation Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. Rav. 86 (1981).
6. D. LEDuc, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE F.C.C.: A CRIsIs IN MEDIA CONTROL 67 (1973).
7. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIn. NEws 4657 [hereinafter H.R. RP. 934 reprinted in USCCANJ; S. REP. No. 67, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. 671; G. Gn.LEsPE, Puauc AccEss CABLE
TELEVISION ni TM UNITED STATES AND CANADA 19-20 (1975) (radio station owner L.E. "Ed"
Parsons, at wife's insistence for better television picture from Seattle stations, mounted antenna
on roof of local hotel and strung wire to apartment) (citation omitted); D. LEDuc, supra note
6, at 68.
8. S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 5. Apparently many early CATV entrepreneurs were either
appliance store owners or television repairmen attempting to increase business. M. HAmBuRo,
ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BusnIEss ASPECTS OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION §1.02 (rev.
ed. 1982) (John Walson, Sr., an appliance store owner, constructed the CATV system to increase
sales of television sets as well as collect subscriber fees). This phenomenon closely tracks the
modus operandi of the early radio industry pioneers, whose desire to construct radio stations
and create programming was fueled by the anticipated profit from selling more radios. D.
LEDuc, supra note 6, at 67.
9. See G. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 19. See also S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 5 n.l; M.
HA BURo, supra note 8, § 1.02; R. ORINGEL & S. BuscE, T- E AccEsS MANAGER'S HANDBOOK:
A GUIDE FOR MANAGING CommuNiTy TELEVISION 1-2 (1987).
10. See M. HAMatnO, supra note 8, § 1.02; D. LEDuc, supra note 6, at 68.
11. See, e.g., M. HAMuRo, supra note 8, §1.02 (Mahonoy City system charged $100
installation, $2 monthly fee); D. LEDuc, supra note 6, at 67 (typical system charged $100
installation, $5 monthly fee); R. ORINGEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 2 (Lansford system
charged $125 installation, S3 monthly fee).
Today the average basic monthly fee is $12.48. Telephone interview with Tom Kavanaugh,
Regional Marketing Analyst, Showtime Networks, Inc. (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Kavanaugh
interview).
12. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 20, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4657.
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Early CATV's sole purpose was to retransmit distant broadcast television
signals to rural, remote areas. Most early judicial opinions that ventured to
define CATV shared this assessment. CATV existed to "amplify and
distribute television signals of good quality to areas where reception [was]
non-existent or difficult.' 41 4 Because broadcast signals travel in straight paths,
diminish with distance, and lose clarity when encountering obstacles like
mountains,S remote, rural areas were the first gaps in the broadcasting void
for CATV systems to fill. By installing an antenna on a high location-such
as a nearby hill or mountain-the CATV operator would pick up the
broadcast signal and transmit it by wire or cable. 6 The signal would be
transmitted on utility poles or in underground conduits downhill from the
antenna, through various amplification equipment, to the back of the sub-
scriber's television set, thereby providing interference-free service . 7
As technology advanced, the nature of CATV changed dramatically. While
early systems had a capacity for three to five channels, technology improve-
ments led to a 12 channel capacity in the 1960's, 20 channels in the early
1970's, 36 in the late 1970's, and 54 channels in the early 1980's.1 Today's
state-of-the-art systems have the capacity to offer well over 100 channels.' 9
Advancement was not limited to increases in CATV channel capacity.
Programming offered by the CATV company expanded beyond the mere
retransmission of broadcast signals. Technology advanced so that the CATV
operator could "cablecast"20 programming produced by itself or third parties.
In 1975, Home Box Office became the first company to distribute its own
13. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1968); Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp. v. F.C.C., 321 F.2d 359, 361 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ciarksburg
Publishing Co. v. F.C.C., 225 F.2d 511, 517 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
14. Clarksburg Publishing Co., 225 F.2d at 517 n.6.
15. S. RPp. 67, supra note 7, at 4.
16. "The cable itself is a coaxial cable with a conductive wire core couched in foam
insulation, a conductive aluminum web, and plastic sheathing." Sibary, The Cable Communi.
cations Policy Act of 1984 v. The First Amendment, 7 Comm./ENr. L.J. 381, 383 (1985).
17. Clarksburg Publishing Co., 225 F.2d at 517 n.6; In re CATV and TV Repeater Services,
26 F.C.C. 403, 407 (1959); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. i.E. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 252
(1958); S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 4.
18. 0. SHAPIRo, P. KURLUAND & J. MERCURIO, 'CABLESPEECH': 'IM CASE FOR FIRST AmssND-
MENT PROECTION 1 (1983).
19. S. Rap. 67, supra note 7, at 4; 0. SHAMo, P. KURLAND & J. MEacuIo, supra note
18, at 1. A sample of 1227 midwest cable systems reflects the following channel capacity
breakdown: 1) less than 15 channels-220 systems; 2) greater than 15 and less than 40 channels-
782 systems; 3) greater than 40 and less than 60 channels-201 systems; 4) greater than 60
channels-24 systems. Kavanaugh interview, supra note 11.
20. "Cablecasting" is "programming distributed on a CATV system which has been orig.
inated by the CATV operator or by another entity, exclusive of broadcast signals carried on
the system." In re CATV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, First Report and Order), 20 F.C.C.2d 201, app.
at 223 (1969). Cablecasting was later subdivided into "origination cablecasting" (under the
control of the cable operator) and "access cablecasting" (under the control of third parties).
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.CC.2d 143, app. at 215 (1972). For further discussion
of "cablecasting," see infra notes 123-164 and accompanying text.
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programming nationally by satellite to CATV systems.2' From its simple
beginnings, CATV was transformed into a "complex electronic distribution
system with multichannel capacity, two-way transmission capability, local
distribution hubs, and local, regional and national interconnection of hubs
through terrestrial microwave and domestic satellite facilities."'
Because CATV systems now offered more services than the term "com-
munity antenna television" connoted,23 they became known as "cable tele-
21. G. SAPIRo, P. Kuu.'w & J. ME-cumuo, supra note 18, at 2.
22. Id. at I.
23. A sample of additional services that the cable industry planned to offer and the public
hoped to receive included:
[Flacsimile reproduction of newspapers, magazines, documents, etc.; electronic mail
delivery; merchandising; business concern links to branch offices, primary customers
or suppliers; access to computers; e.g., man to computer communications in the
nature of inquiry and response (credit checks, airline reservations, branch banking,
etc.), information retrieval (library and other reference material, etc.), and computer
to computer communications; the furtherance of various governmental programs
on a Federal, State and municipal level; e.g., employment services and manpower
utilization, special communications systems to reach particular neighborhoods or
ethnic groups within a community, and for municipal surveillance of public areas
for protection against crime, fire detection, control of air pollution and traffic;
various educational and training programs; e.g., job and literacy training, pre-
school programs in the nature of "Project Headstart," and to enable professional
groups such as doctors to keep abreast of developments in their fields; and the
provision of a low cost outlet for political candidates, advertisers, amateur expression
(e.g., community or university drama groups) and for other moderately funded
organizations or persons desiring access to the community or a particular segment
of the community.
Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 18397, 15 F.C.C.2d
417, 420 (1968). See also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings]. Sue Buske, executive director, National Federation of Local
Cable Programmers stated:
Communities can use cable to provide diagnostic and other health services to the
elderly or to those confined to the home; Communities can use cable to provide
job training services, educational services, or to deliver other social services effi-
ciently; Cable systems can be utilized for load management by private or public
electric utilities, providing significant saving for the utility and resulting in more
efficient use of our nation's energy resources; .... Cable systems can be utilized
to provide traffic control, security services and alarm services. If, for example,
homes in an area are hooked to the fire department, the fire department will be
able to respond more quickly to alarms reducing the loss of life and dproperty [sic],
and ultimately (we hope) insurance rates.
Zd.
See also Ledbetter, An Overview of Cable Television, reprinted in CABLE TELEVISION IN THE
Cnas: ComiwuNrry CONTROL, PtuBLic AccEss, mD MiNoRn OWNERSHn 13 (C. TATE ed. 1971)
[hereinafter C. TATE) (speed mail flow, increase computer accessibility and interaction, com-
puterize traffic control, provide emergency communication for combatting crime, offer dem-
onstrations and remote retail shopping for marketers); Tate, Community Control of Cable
Television Systems, reprinted in C. TATE, at 23 (provide in-home education for handicapped
and elderly, increase use of computerized grading in schools, disseminate medical and dental
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 38:1051
vision" or "cable systems."' 4 Under current federal cable legislation, z 2j
"cable system" is generally defined as "a facility, consisting of a set of
closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and
control equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes
video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a
community." Today, cable television has grown to a $12,000,000,000.00
industry, comprised of 8,000 cable systems subscribed to by more than half
of the households in the United States. 27
Cable currently delivers programming from four sources: retransmission
of broadcast stations; satellite-delivered programmihg from professional ven-
dors; origination of programming produced by the cable operator, known
as local origination; and access programming produced by local individuals
information, list substandard and abandoned housing, review leases and installation contracts,
discuss consumer issues, establish consumer hotline for legal aid and consumer protection,
increase use of videotape depositions in litigation, provide alarms systems for homes, and allow
gas, water, and electric meter reading); Head, Voices on the Cable, HARPEas, Mar. 1973, at
28, 30 (reduce overcrowded classrooms, measure environmental deterioration, disperse over-
crowded populations in large cities, lessen neighborhood violence, prevent and control crime,
and obviate unnecessary business trips).
For a less optimistic view of cable, see Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F.
Supp. 652, 665, 667 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ("The public has about as much real need for the
services of CATV systems as it does for hand carved ivory back-scratchers.... [CATV is)
perhaps one of the least necessary services imaginable.").
24. See Amendment of Pt. 74, subpt. K, §§ 74.1107; 74.1031(c); 74.1105(a),(b), 36 F.C.C.2d
143, 144 n.9 (1972). See also Berkshire Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976,
979 n.1 (D.R.I. 1983) ("Cable television is a broader term that refers to systems capable not
only of re-transmitting television broadcast signals but also of transmitting a variety of pro-
gramming from non-broadcast sources made possible by satellite delivery systems as well as
programming originated in their own studios.").
Today, many cable systems trarismit signals via optical fiber, not cable. See S. RaP. 67,
supra note 7, at 4. Presumably, "optical fiber system" or "fiber system" will not replace the
"cable television system" moniker. Optical fiber cables contain "one or more optical fibers
through which laser light, modulated to carry information, is transmitted." Miller & Beals,
supra note 5, at 87 n.10.
25. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (West Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter 1984 Cable Act]. For further
discussion of this Act see infta notes 165-231 and accompanying text.
26. 1984 Cable Act § 522(6). See also H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 44, reprinted in
USCCAN, at 4681 (same). The original Senate bill that became the 1984 Cable Act defined
"cable system" as:
a facility or combination of facilities under the ownership or control of any person
or persons, which consist of a primary control center used to receive and retransmit,
or to originate broadband telecommunications service over one or more coaxial
cables, or other closed transmission media, from the primary control center to a
point of reception at the premises of a cable subscriber.
S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 18-19, 35.,
27. R. Purvis, Bigotry and Cable TV: Legal Issues and Community Responses, NATIONAL
INsTmrE AoAwsT PRXUDICE AIn VIOLENCE 1 (1988) (hereinafter NIAPV REPORT].
1056
CABLE PUBLIC ACCESS CHANNELS
and organizations not associated with the cable operator. 28 Satellite-delivered
programming consists of pay television,2 9 all-news networks, 0 superstations,3 1
religious networks,32 and other specialized 3  programming services.3 4
Local origination programming is produced, directed, engineered, and
controlled by cable company employees. 5 The cable operator determines the
content of the programs and often sells advertising time during the show.3 6
Cable systems in Montana" and Maryland developed local origination in the
early 1950's.11 A recent study found that 90 percent of cable operators
28. See S. REp. 67, supra note 7, at 5:
Systems ... [carry] local and distant signals, multiple tiers of pay programming,
locally originated information and entertainment, text services, C-SPAN's trans-
mission of the proceedings of the House of Representatives and Senate committee
proceedings, 24-hour news channels, health programming, religious programming
for children and other special audiences, alert and alarm services, and networks
specializing in sports events.
Id. See also Miller & Beals, supra note 5, at 87 (broadcast entertainment, channels for public
and governmental use, local origination programming, educational channels, closed circuit
channels which connect public institutions, specialty information channels, all news channels
and FM radio channels).
A recent study suggests that the channels most valued by cable subscribers are distant broadcast
signals, pay programming, news channels, and sports channels. Sparkes & Kang, Public Reac-
tions to Cable Television: Time in the Diffusion Process, 30 J. BRoADcASTmo & ELEc. MEDIA
213, 225 (1986).
29. These services usually require that the subscriber pay an additional fee for each service
above the monthly cable fee. Pay television programming services include (with their average
monthly charge in parentheses); Home Box Office ($10.13); The Movie Channel ($9.85);
Showtime ($9.67); The Playboy Channel ($9.65); The Disney Channel ($9.21); and regional
sports networks. Kavanaugh interview, supra note 11.
30. News networks include: Cable News Network; Cable News Network Headline News; C-
SPAN (covers the House of Representatives); and C-SPAN II (covers the Senate).
31. WTBS in Atlanta, WOR in New York, and WON in Chicago are examples.
32. Religious services include: the Christian Broadcasting Network; Eternal World Television
Network; and Praise The Lord/People That Love (PTL).
33. Specialized networks include: Black Entertainment Television (BET) (programming pro-
duced by or concerning African-Americans); the Discovery Channel (travel and science); En-
tertainment-Sports Programming Network (ESPN) (sports); Home Shopping Network
(consumerism); Music Television (MTV) (music videos); the Nashville Network (TNN) (country
music videos); Nickelodeon (children's programming); and the USA Network (sports and general
entertainment).
34. R. ORINOEL & S. Busi.a, supra note 9, at 3-4 (descriptions of each of aforementioned
programming categories).
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. Apparently the CATV operator in Livingston, Montana, also the owner of a local AM
radio station, produced origination programming in the radio station studio using a camera.
In re CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 408 n.2 (1959). The operator also
presented advertising slides during his origination productions. Id.
38. R. ORMnOEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 12. By the late 1960's at least 30 operators
produced local origination programming. rd.
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produced local origination programming. 9 In order of frequency, the study
found that programming cablecast on local origination channels included
community bulletin boards (automated alphanumeric programming), public
service announcements, local sports, public meetings, interview shows, panel
discussions on public issues, local news, and call-in shows.'4 Cable subscribers
often confuse access programming-produced by third parties-with local
origination because both are locally produced and often share the same
channel.
41
B. Access Programming
Cable access, in its broadest sense, is the right of parties other than the
cable operator to use cable system facilities to produce and cablecast pro-
gramming free from the editorial control of the cable operator. 42 From a
metaphysical standpoint, access proponents subscribe to the theory that the
decentralization of telecommunications program control can serve to enhance
the quality of life in a community.43 Most studies that examined the issue
of access to cable in the early 1970's recommended the concept." In 1972,
the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications concluded:
There is a need, in every community for the expression of common notions,
for the expression of artistic and cultural endeavors; a need to serve the
elderly, the deaf, the very young.... There is a need to express oneself
in forms that can be carried across boundaries to similar communities
elsewhere, and indeed to dissimilar communities which might profit from
the repression of unpopular views. There is a pervasive need, in short, to
be heard."
The Cabinet Committee on Cable Television in 1974 also supported access:
Cable offers countless Americans a chance to speak for themselves and
among themselves in their own way, and a chance to share with one
39. Moss & Warren, Public Policy and Community-Oriented Uses of Cable Television, 20
URB. ArF. Q. 233, 246 (1984) (study encompassed cable systems in New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut and included 22 operators).
40. Id. at 247. See also R. OJUNGoL & S. BusiaE, supra note 9, at 13 (extensive list of
examples of local origination channel programming). Cf. Ledbetter, Cablecasting: Local Orig-
ination for Cable Television, reprinted in C. TAT, supra note 23, at 52-53 (four local origination
case studies from the early 1970's).
41. R. ORINOEL & S. BusKa, supra note 9, at 10-11.
42. Shapiro, Access, reprinted in CUIM.ENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV 1981 179 (1981). See
also "Options for Cable Legislation, " Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance, House Energy and Commerce Comm., 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 429 (1983) [hereinafter House Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of William S. Singer,
Chicago Access Corp.).
43. 0. GMLESPIE, supra note 7, at 79 (quoting Henaut, A Few Notes on Regional Projects,
AccEss 11 (Autumn 1972)).
44. See Nadel, Cablespeech for Whom?, 4 CARwozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 70 n.104 (1985)
(studies cited therein).
45. SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON Tim CAin.: Ti TEEVlSION OF
A~uNDANcB (1971).
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another their experiences, their opinions, their frustrations and their hopes.'
Access proponents envision the channels as an alternative to the "standard
prepackaged TV fare" on broadcast channels.4 7 Access provides an oppor-
tunity for the viewer to "strike back" at the sterile and mundane ad-
supported network programming, monopolized by a select few media giants.4 1
This decentralization of programming would bring with it desired program
diversity.'9 Furthermore, access proponents insist that diverse access pro-
gramming would "serve to promote a more enlightened and better informed
citizeary."10
Access programming is categorized into public, educational, governmental
(or municipal), and commercial (or leased) access." Each programming
46. CABIm ComIrmTEE ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (1974)
[hereinafter CABINET CoMMrrEE ON CABLE TV]. See also Baran, On the Impact of the New
Communications Media Upon Social Values, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 244 (1969), in which
the author stated:
This flood of news flowing downward and the felt lack of an upward channel of
reply can be expected to worsen in the near term. We need an information feedback
channel to assure the citizen that his specific message (not the group response) has,
in fact, been received by the power structure. Failure to supply such a channel
would appear to guarantee alienation from the political process.
Id. at 251.
47. See R. KLETTER, CABLE TELEVISION: MAXIO PuBuc AcCEss EFFEcTIvE 1 (1973).
48. Id.; Note, Quincy Cable and Its Effect on the Access Provisions of the 1984 Cable Act,
61 NOTRE DA ME L. REv. 426, 431 n.47 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Quincy Cable] (citing 2 C.
FERus, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW § 15.01 (1985)). Ironically, in the late
1960's, the Nixon-appointed F.C.C. Commissioners backed mandatory access requirements
because the administration felt access programming might diminish the power of the "liberal"
commercial television networks, thereby benefitting the Republican party. See Price, Requiem
for the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the F.C.C., 61 VA. L. REv. 541, 542 (1975) ("The
possibility of support for cable television served as a weapon for the Nixon administration in
Its feud against the networks."); Meehan, Coming Up Next on Channel C: Youl, SATURDAY
Rsvmw, Sept. 9, 1972, at 14, 18. For a discussion on the F.C.C.'s role in access, see infra
notes 1 12-64 and accompanying text.
49. For a more thorough discussion of "diversity," see infra notes 199-202 and accompa-
nying text.
50. 130 CoNe. REc. H 10440 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rinaldo). See also
H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4667; C. TATE, supra note 23,
at 13. Beyond the information citizens receive directly from access programming, those who
get involved in producing shows will also gain knowledge. These users will be "more likely
than others to identify elements of subjectivity, fabrication, and inaccuracy in television
programs" due to their new-found knowledge of television production. See Minniberg, Circum-
stances Within Our Control: Promoting Freedom of Expression Through Cable Television, 11
HASTIOS CONST. L.Q. 551, 584 n.201 (1984) (studies cited therein).
51. R. OQINOEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 11. Other minor specialized access categories
include religious and elderly access. Under Rhode Island regulations, "other" access channels
may include "religious, cultural, ethnic heritage, and library access." See Berkshire Cablevision
of R.I. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 n.3 (D.R.I. 1983). For a brief account of religion's
early contribution to access, see 0. GIL.EsPIE, supra note 7, at 42-45. Religious access may
contain "such events as church activities ... or bible study discussion." Prangley, Local
Community Access Programming: "A Community Pipeline," 9 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 355,
1989] 1059
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category can have an access channel devoted to it exclusively, or often, a
cable operator will combine various access programming umbrellas, and local
origination, on one channel.
1. Public Access
A public access channel is a channel "set aside by the cable operator for
exclusive use by local individuals and community. groups. 51 2 The cable
operator often provides studios, production equipment, and personnel, to
assist access users in developing programming. 4 The citizen or community
organization users serve as the broadcasters, actors, directors, producers,
engineers and script writers. 5 Public access has been analogized to an
electronic soap box,5 6 a modern town square, 7 free-form television,'$ the
electronic parallel to the printed leaflet,59 an apartment building's lobby TV
356 (1982-83).
One access proponent described the breadth of all access programming:
Folk acts of the Southeast, hosted by a local museum; the county advocate, focusing
on county agencies; live coverage of city council meetings; individual editorials;
local news, covering a suburban area, produced by the junior league of that area;
two-way programming including discussions with city officials; a series on law-
related matters produced by a local bar association; programming on reading by
local public libraries; and adult education courses.
Under the access rubric there is religious programming, senior citizen program-
ming, health information programming, educational programming for all age levels,
public service announcements, news, (etc).
House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 429-30 (statement of William S. Singer, Chicago
Access Corp.).
52. Ronka, Cable TV: Preserving Public Access, 4 L.A. LAW. 8, 9 (1981).
53. In Dayton, Ohio, for example, the staff of the access management organization will
"produce up to a 15 minute cameo production for any [resident] at no charge" up to "6 times
during a calendar year." ACCESS-Dayton: Operating Rules and Regulations § 2.7 (Dayton,
Ohio, Apr. 1986).
54. Ronka, supra note 52, at 9. See, e.g., Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 754
F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (potential cable operator to provide staff and facilities), q/f'd
on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659
F. Supp. 580, 582 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (potential operator to support access programming with
$120,000 upon award of franchise, $240,000 thereafter in monthly installments of $10,000,
followed by monthly payments based upon percentage of gross receipts), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1084
(3d Cir. 1988).
55. R. ORaMOEL & S, BusKs, supra note 9, at 10-11; Ronka, supra note 52, at 9.
56. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4667; Price, supra note
48, at 551; TV Shows Made By People Like You, CHANotNc Taos, Apr. 1982, at 80. According
to one study of public access awareness in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, "public access is truly an
'electronic soap box' " to those residents aware of its existence. Porter & Banks, Cable Public
Access as a Public Forum, 65 JouRNAusm Q. 39, 44 (1988).
57. Minniberg, supra note 50, at 598.
58. TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra note 56, at 80.
59. H.R. REp. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4667. See also NIAPV
REPoRT, supra note 27, at 4 (quoting cable commentator comparing access to "an electronic
Tom Paine; it's an electronic pamphleteer").
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monitor," the anti-channel, 6' "spinach and Latin lessons," 62 and Johann
Guttenberg's printing press.63 Public access is all of these. On public access,
anyone can "do their own thing"" and "interject[ ] a breeze of untrammeled
and unrestrained discussion ' '6s into television viewing. Approximately 1,500
cable systems provide public access channels and facilities."
The public access idea began as a local phenomenon. The first reported
use of public access was in Dale City, Virginia, where the cable operator
opened up his local origination channel to the Junior Chamber of Commerce
for community programming. 67 The Dale City experiment lasted from De-
cember 1968 to early 1970, when lack of funding killed the project. 61 New
York City provided the next, and more widely recognized, experience in
public access. 69 In New York, a group of educational, artistic, and community
organizations developed the idea of public access and helped draft it into
the city's cable franchise agreements.70 By July 1, 1971, each of the two
cable companies in New York provided two channels for public access.71 In
60. D. LEDuC, BEYOND BROADCASTING: PATTERNS iN POLICY AND LAW 157 (1987) ("[Tlhe
cable's public-access channels seem to be approached by the public less as a viewing alternative
than as an 'experience,' as one would watch an apartment building's lobby TV monitor in the
hope of seeing a neighbor do something foolish in an unguarded moment.").
61. D. OTnME, THE WInED ISLAND: TnE FiRST Two YARiS OF PUBLC ACCESS TO CABLE
TELEVISION IN MANHATT 32 (1973).
62. In re Cable Television Channel Capacity (Pt. 76, § 76.251), 53 F.C.C.2d 782, 800 (1975)
(Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (access is a " 'merit' good-
which like spinach and Latin lessons are 'good' for us and which we should have-whether or
not we want them bad enough to pay for them"); Wirth & Cobb-Reiley, A First Amendment
Critique of the 1984 Cable Act, 31 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTONIC M.mA 391, 393 (1987)
(access as "merit good").
63. R. OaRomL & S. BuSKE, supra note 9, at 7-8. The authors noted that before the printing
press, "written communication was controlled for the most part by the power brokers-the
feudal lords, the wealthy, and the church." Id. at 7. They parallel that concentration of power
to the current "domination of broadcast television by large corporations and networks." Id.
at 8. They conclude that public access, like the advent of the printing press, will add to the
diversity of information available to citizens. Id.
64. TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra note 56, at 80.
65. Ronka, supra note 52, at 12.
66. McCoy, White Supremacists Find Free Forum Via Public Access Cable TV Stations,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 12, 1988, at 38, col. 5. Cf. Moss & Warren, supra note 39, at
244 (study finding 80% of surveyed cable systems in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut
have at least one public access channel).
67. G. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 35-36.
68. Id.
69. See generally D. OTHMER, supra note 61 (description of origins of access in New York
City in early 1970's).
70. Clifford, Vanity Video, NEW YORK, Aug. 6, 1979, at 34. See also Note, Quincy Cable,
supra note 48, at 431 n.47 (citing 2 C. FERIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW
§ 15.01 (1985)). For a discussion of the cable franchising process, see infra notes 171-72 and
accompanying text.
71. G. GILLESPIE, supra note 7, at 36; D. OTHMER, supra note 61, at 1; Meehan, supra note
48, at 19.
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January 1972, the next innovation in public access occurred when the cable
system in Reading, Pennsylvania, provided free office space, a telephone
and $6,000 worth of videotape equipment to spur public access program
development.72 Further public access advancements at the local level were
stalled when in February, 1972, the F.C.C. released its Cable Television
Report and Order which set out federal access requirements.7
The success of public access varies from system to system and is dependent
on the maturity of the cable system, 74 the level of public access funding, and
the commitment of the public, local government and the cable company to
make public access work.7 Viewer awareness of public access has ranged
from "horrible ' 76 to 86 percent of surveyed cable subscribers.7 7 One report
found that the public access channel in East Lansing, Michigan, attracted a
five percent rating from the cable system's 20,000 subscribers.78 A public
access channel in Bloomington, Indiana is reported to be watched by 50
percent of the adult-viewing audience and 100 percent of the children.' 9
Perhaps the most (in)famous access user is New York City's Ugly George,
72. G. Gmt.Lspm, supra note 7, at 38.
73. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). For further discussion of the F.C.C. access requirements, see
infra notes 112-64 and accompanying text.
74. Porter & Banks, supra note 56, at 44. Cf. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42,
at 328-29 (statement of Samuel A. Simon, executive director, Telecommunications Research
and Action Center, discussing public access learning curve for citizens).
75. See generally 1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 434 (statement of Sue
Buske, executive director, National Federation of Local Cable Programmers); R. ORnboaL &
S. BuscaE, supra note 9, at 10 (list of eight factors for successful access).
76. Varley, Cities as Operators, TECH. Rav., Jan. 1983, at 59 (quoting representative from
National Cable Television Association ("NCTA"), lobbying arm for large cable operators). Cf.
Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1062 n.87 (8th Cir. 1978) (in survey conducted
in mid-1970's of 10,000 cable subscribers, 97% of those surveyed were disinterested in viewing
access programming if they had to pay $1.75 to $2.00 per month for channel), aff'd, 440 U.S.
689 (1979).
77. R. O1No EL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 151-52 (citing survey of Kalamazoo, Michigan,
cable subscribers). This study also found that, of all cable subscribers, 76% had watched public
access at one time and 74% said the presence of public access was not at all important in their
decision to subscribe to cable. Id. A similar survey of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, cable subscribers
found public awareness at 50%, increasing to 66% in mature cable systems. Porter & Banks,
supra note 56, at 44.
Ironically, one study suggests that nonsubscribers would be the audience most interested in
the governmental access, educational access, and local access programming provided on cable
systems. Sparkes & Kang, supra note 28, at 225.
78. Taylor, "People's TV" Is Here-on Cable Systems, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPoRT, May
10, 1982, at 84. A study by college students in Ithaca, New York found that five percent of
the people surveyed had seen the "activist" public access news program entitled "More Than
the News" at least once. Schultz, Activists Take to the Airwaves, Tna I'aooasssrva, Sept. 1987,
at 13.
79. Smith, Library Clout in Local Cable, AmmucAN LwRARY, Sept. 1981, at 500. The
survey found that 35% of subscribers watched the city council meetings on a regular basis and
38% of those surveyed cited local programming as a reason for subscribing to cable. Id. See
also Taylor, supra note 78, at 84 (more on child-produced programming in Bloomington, Ind.).
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whose access show, "The Ugly George Hour of Truth, Sex and Violence,"
contains scenes of women disrobing on the streets and in the alleys of New
York City. 0 His program is estimated to have attracted as many as 150,000
viewers out of a possible audience of 300,000 cable subscribers. 1
As with viewer awareness, the level of participation in producing public
access programming varies from community to community. One source
estimated that no more than six percent of cable subscribers actively partic-
ipate in public access programming. 2 Some suggest that the number of
people involved in producing cable access programming is greater than the
number who watch it. 3 In many communities, public access programming
is supported (technically and monetarily) by libraries, schools, governmental
agencies, community arts foundations, and nonprofit groups. 4 Since Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin, inaugurated its public access channel in 1984, over 250
nonprofit/community organizations and over 1,550 individuals have been
trained and certified to use public access equipment." In Columbus, Ohio,
760 people were trained to use public access in 1987, and an average of 403
citizens were trained per year from 1984 to 1986.86
The amount of programming produced differs from community to com-
munity as well. In Columbus, Ohio, for example, public access users pro-
duced 2,188 programs in 1987, and averaged 1,525 per year from 1984 to
1986.17 One access advocate noted that the San Jose, California, cable system
carried four or five hours of community programming per day, adding up
to thousands of hours per year.8 However, in a study conducted in the early
1980's of a cable system with nine public access channels, programming
80. Ugly George first cablecast his program on public access in 1976. In 1981 he moved his
program from public access to leased access, see infra note 109-10 and accompanying text for
description of leased access, so he could sell advertising time during his program. See George
P. Urban a/k/a "Ugly George" v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 1821
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987) (LExis 9174, Genfed library, Dist file).
81. Babyak, On the Prowl with Ugly George, NEw YoRK, Sept. 1, 1980, at 35-36. Ugly
George's half-hour program is cablecast three nights per week at 11:30 p.m. M. HAMmuRo,
supra note 8, § 6.05[41.
82. TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra note 56, at 83.
83. In re Amendment of Part 76 of the F.C.C.'s Rules and Regulations re Cable Television
Channel Capacity and Access Requirements of § 76.251, 53 F.C.C.2d 782, 801 (1975) (Robinson,
Comm'r, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
84. TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra note 56, at 80.
85. Milwaukee Access Telecommunications Authority: Fact Sheet (Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
1987).
86. 1987 Annual Report Cable 21-ACTV: The Community Channel (Columbus, Ohio,
June 1988).
87. Id.
88. 1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 435 (statement of Bruce Jacobs,
director, Cooperative Communications Project). Jacobs defended the four to five hour level of
daily programming: "I would say that is probably a good more than the average over-the-air
broadcast station." Id.
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accounted for only 3.7 percent of the channels' total broadcast time."
Additionally, various studies and data have suggested that public access
channels offer a variety of topics and formats.90 In Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
for example, the types of groups who have used public access include social
service (28%), community (25%), education (12%), cultural (8%), religious
(8%), arts (8%), health (7%), and government (3%).91 Furthermore, because
the access producer has complete control over the content of his show, the
quality of public access programming varies with the personality, skill, and
taste of the access producer.92 Access programs have been used to promote
nonprofit community organizations, 3 involve senior citizens, 94 present polit-
ical issues, 9 teach the mentally retarded to communicate, 96 discuss current
89. Id. at 255 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president, National Cable Television
Association). See also House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 61 (statements of Thomas
E. Wheeler, president, National Cable Television Association (cites 3.701o figure without men-
tioning number of access channels involved) and Trygve Myhren, chairman and chief executive
officer, American Television and Communications Corp. (same)). Cf. Midwest Video Corp. v.
F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1062 n.87 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing survey of 149 cable systems showing
that access channels went unused an average of 92% of the time).
90. Porter & Banks, supra note 56, at 39.
91. Milwaukee Access Telecommunications Authority: Fact Sheet (Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
1987).
92. See R. KIETTER, supra note 47, at I (access could "restore to the television screen some
qualities that have nearly been refined out of it; originality; controversy; realism; even attractive
amateurishness").
93. In Columbus, Ohio, community groups are encouraged to use public access to:
1. Raise the profile of the group's organization.
2. Educate the community about the organization's concerns.
3. Acquaint potential clients with the organization's services.
4. Recruit volunteers and offer public acknowledgement for their contributions.
S. Gain access to prime time viewing audience.
6. Exercise artistic and editorial control of program content.
7. Save expenses with cost effective method for promotion, publicity, and perform-
ance.
8. Obtain program ownership for other avenues of distribution and use.
9. Learn how to work with the other television outlets.
Think Video: Non-Profits & Public Access: ACTV-Channel 21 (Columbus, Ohio, Jan. 1988).
94. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Los Angeles Community Access Television, Alliance
for Communications Democracy and National Association for Better Broadcasting in Opposition
to Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles, (Oct. 17, 1988) (No. 83 5846 CBM (BX)) [hereinafter Preferred Brief] (senior
citizens program in Portland, Oregon); Taylor, supra note 78, at 84 ("Generation Gap" program
in Reading, Pennsylvania); TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra note 56, at 83 (interview
show with senior citizens in Kansas City, Missouri).
95. See, e.g., H. DoIDICK & J. LYLE, ACCESS BY LOCAL POLITICAL CANDMATES TO CABLE
TELEviSION: A REPORT OF AN EXPERMENT (1971) (early experiment where local politicians used
public access as a forum in Hawaiian election); Taylor, supra note 78, at 84 (public access
program on demonstration against Ronald Reagan speech in Albuquerque, New Mexico).
96. See, e.g., Preferred Brief, supra note 94, at 3-4 (Chicago's Project Vital trains mentally
retarded individuals to use cameras and create programming); TV Shows Made by People Like
You, supra note 56, at 83 ("day-in-the.life" show produced by handicapped individuals in
Minnesota, including account of how they put together the access program).
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events, 97 and present artists and entertainers. At the other end of the spectrum
are programs produced by religious cults, 9 advocates of drug legalization,"
and purveyors of sexually-explicit fare.' °°
2. Governmental Access
Government access channels are exclusively controlled by the local munic-
ipal government.' 0' Through government access, local officials can more
easily and effectively reach their constituents'0 2 and will, it is hoped, become
more accessible to the voters.'03 The government can use these channels either
as a forum for distributing information about local government activities or
as a propaganda tool.'10 Shows produced for government access include
programs dealing with an explanation of the city budget, budget hearing
coverage, an explanation of cpdes/ordinances, consumer information, can-
didate debates/forums, fire safety, home security, consumer issues, planning
issues, health issues, hearing impaired, elderly, yopth, physically disabled,
and minority groups.' 0 '
97. See, e.g., R. OanMOEL & S. Busr.c, supra note 9, at 168-69 (public access show in Austin,
Texas, which has included interviews with figures such as former United States Attorney General,
Nobel-prize winning biologist, and well-known civil rights lawyer).
98. Dobson, Pray TV: A Powerful New Tool for Religious Cults?, TH FuTumsT, Aug.
1982, at 58.
99. Meehan, supra note 48, at 20.
100. The majority of sexually-explicit public access programming emanates from New York.
See, e.g., Babyak, supra note 81, at 35 (Ugly George program containing scenes of various
women disrobing); Mano, Public Access TV, NAT'L REv., Nov. 21, 1975, at 1298 (tongue-in-
cheek account of experience in public access training class in New York); Post, Notes on the
Underground, NEw YORK, Mar. 9, 1981, at 42; Waters, The Lewd Tube, NEwswEE, Dec. 29,
1975, at 61 (strippers, topless salesladies in tropical-fish store, and contortionist); see generally
D. OrmmR, supra note 61 (review of first two years of access in New York City with
programming descriptions).
As one commentator opined, "[wle may have small groups around the country using electrical
communications of the future to share a common interest in some particularly novel form of
pornography. Don't dismiss the idea completely. Nature abhors an empty communications
channel." Baran, supra note 46, at 254.
101. Miller & Beals, supra note 5, at 112. Some commentators propose that "governmental"
access be referred to as "municipal" access because that label "better describes the level of
government that employs access." R. OuINGEL & S. BusrE, supra note 9, at 100. Some have
suggested that governmental access should not be limited to municipal officials, but should be
opened up to State and Federal officials as well. See 1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 23, at 220 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president, National Cable Television
Association).
102. R. OINOEL & S. Busica, supra note 9, at 11.
103. Id. at 100. See also Miller & Beals, supra note 5, at 112.
104. R. OVNOEL & S. Busics, supra note 9, at 100. The authors did not discern any negative
connotation by the term "propaganda." Most govfrnment access channels are operated as a
forum for the distribution of information to the public. Id.
105. Id. at 114. For other uses of government access, see id. at 11, 100 (bulletin boards
listing holidays, trash pickups, agendas of municipal meetings, live city council meetings).
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3. Educational Access
Community groups program educational access channels in an effort to
educate subscribers and citizens of all ages. Typically, local school system
officials control educational access with the assistance of teachers, students,
and school administrators.'0 School officials can use educational access to
1) bring school information to the community; 2) update teacher training;
and 3) instruct students on using the television medium. '°7 These channels
carry school lunch menus, bulletin boards of school events, school plays,
high school sporting events, continuing education courses for adults, school
board meetings, and special education for handicapped.' °8
4. Commercial or Leased Access
Commercial access is set aside for commercial programming produced by
third parties. The programming may be commercial itself (e.g., promoting
a local business), or it may be noncommercial yet include advertising. Cable
operators charge leased access users an hourly fee for time on the channel.109
In Athens, Georgia, the local newspaper leased a channel from the cable
operator to produce a local news program entitled, "Observer Television.""'0
Since Athens lacks a local broadcast station, it is quite possible that "Ob-
server Television" fills a need for local Athens news."'
C. Government Regulation of the Cable Industry
1. F.C.C. Regulation of Cable and Access
From the late 1950's through the early 1960's, cable television went
unregulated on the federal level." 2 During that period, the systems were
106. R. OimoEm. & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 8.
107. Id. at 93.
108. See, e.g., In re Major Market Cable Television Systems (Pt. 76, § 76.251(a)(l)-(a)(8)),
54 F.C.C.2d 207, 212 (1975) (extensive use of educational access in various Pennsylvania cable
systems); In re Application of Arlington Telecommunications Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 757, 762
(1975) (proposed use of educational access for cable system in Arlington, Virginia); 1982 Sen.
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 435 (statement of Peggy Charren, president, Action for
Children's Television, describing program in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin); R. ORaNOEL & S. Busti,
supra note 9, at 11.
109. See, e.g., George P. Urban, a/k/a "Ugly George" v. Manhattan Cable Television, Inc.,
No. 86 Civ. 1821 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1987) (Laxis 9174, Genfed library, Dist. file) (Manhattan
Cable Television in New York City charges $100 per hour for first year leased access user and
$175 per hour for all others).
110. R. OuN.aEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 169-71.
111. Id.
112. In 1959, the F.C.C. issued an extensive report and order concluding that it was without
jurisdiction over cable television. In re CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
For a general overview of F.C.C. cable television regulation, see Brenner & Price, The 1984
Cable Act: Prologue and Precedents, 4 CARwozo AsRs & ENr. L.J. 19 (1985); Fogarty &
Spielholz, F.C.C. Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero to Plenary in Twenty-Five Years, 37 FED.
Comm. L.J. 113 (1985).
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regulated by local, and sometimes, state government." 3 The F.C.C. saw early
CATV systems as providing an interim service by retransmitting broadcast
service to those rural, remote areas that did not yet have a local broadcast
station." 4 The F.C.C. believed that once this broadcast "coverage vacuum"
was filled with new local stations, cable would disappear.'"' In the late
1950's, the broadcast television industry encouraged the F.C.C. to assert
jurisdiction over cable television pursuant to the Communications Act of
1934.'16 The broadcasters felt that cable television would have an adverse
effect on broadcast television, cutting into advertising revenues and possibly
putting many local UHF channels out of business." 7
The broadcasters finally persuaded the F.C.C. in Carter Mountain Trans-
mission Corp. v. F.C.C.. The broadcasters reasoned that cable television
hindered the agency's ability to regulate the broadcast industry according to
"public interest" standard; the task assigned the F.C.C. under the Com-
munications Act." 8 Beginning in 1962, the F.C.C. began regulating more
and more aspects of cable television." 9 This encroachment culminated in
1966 when the F.C.C. asserted jurisdiction over all cable television systems.120
Subsequently, in the 1968 case of United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
the Supreme Court approved the F.C.C.'s assertion of jurisdiction over cable
113. Cf. Albert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 501 (1977) (review of typical local regulations of cable television).
114. See In re CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. at 407 ("[t]o a substantial extent
... [CATV will] provide service in what would otherwise be 'white areas' where regular direct
reception is not available. It is generally agreed that [CATV has] performed a desired service
in bringing television to populations who would otherwise not have it."); D. LEDuc, supra
note 6, at 66 (same).
115. See D. LEDuc, supra note 6, at 69-70.
116. See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. J.E. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (complaint from
13 broadcast stations against 288 CATV systems urged F.C.C. to assert jurisdiction over CATV
systems as communication common carriers). The Communications Act of 1934 was promulgated
well before the advent of cable television. The F.C.C. sought clarification of its jurisdiction
from Congress in 1959 and again in 1966, however, both proposed bills failed to pass. See
generally United States v. Southwest Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 165 (1968) (discussion of both
bills); M. HMxauao, supra note 8, § 1.08 (discussion of 1966 bill); D. LEDuc, supra note 6,
at 95-111 (discussion of 1959 bill).
117. See Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C. at 253; S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 7-8.
118. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. F.C.C., 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 375 U.S. 951 (1963). One F.C.C. Commissioner later opined that
"[tihe only specific meaning that can be attributed to the phrase 'public interest' as it is used
in the Commission opinion is that it means protecting the private interest of broadcasters by
limiting or suppressing any actual or potential competition by CATV." In re Business Radio
Service (Pt. 91, subpt. L), Relay Television Broadcast Signals (Pt. 21, subpt. 1), Distribution
of Television Broadcast Signals (Pts. 21, 74 and 91), Distribution of Television Signals (§ 74.1103),
and Carriage of Distant Signals (§ 74.1107(a)), 6 F.C.C.2d 309, 337 (1967) (Loevinger, Comm'r,
dissenting).
119. See, e.g., S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 8 (carriage of distant broadcast signals generally,
carriage of distant signals that duplicated local signals, systems that used microwave technology).
120. In re CATV (Pt. 21, subpt. L; Pt. 21, subpt. 1, Pt. 21; Pts. 21, 74 and 91; Second
Report and Order), 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
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television pursuant to section 152(a) of the Communications Act.' 2' The
F.C.C.'s authority was restricted however, to that which was "reasonably
ancillary" to regulate television broadcasting effectively.12
The F.C.C. began to regulate local origination programming in the late
1960's. While it initially dismissed local origination programming as an
isolated phenomenon,' the F.C.C. soon realized the importance of the new
method of programming and, despite protests from the broadcast industry,
condoned local origination since it saw local origination as serving the public
interest by providing an additional outlet for local programming, augmenting
the fare on community-oriented UHF channels. 1' 4 By 1969, the F.C.C. had
promulgated a rule that required all cable systems with more than 3,500
subscribers to originate programming by January 1, 1971.121 The F.C.C.
required cable systems to originate programming, where practicable, as a
condition for the carriage of broadcast signals. 26 The cable operator could
only originate on one channel 21 and had to program the origination channel
to a "significant extent."'12 The cable operator was also required to provide
facilities such as studios, cameras and playback equipment for the local
production and presentation of programs. 29 Programming on origination
channels had to comply with the broadcast requirements of equal time,
sponsorship identification, and fairness. 30 Upholding the origination rule on
121. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
122. Id. at 178. The Court limited the F.C.C.'s authority to that "reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting." Id.
123. See, e.g., In re CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403, 407-08 (1959); Frontier
Broadcasting Co. v. J.E. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 252 (1958) ("It is technically feasible for such
systems to originate their own program material, but we have no information as to the extent
to which this is being done.").
124. See, e.g., In the Matter of Midwest Television, Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 505 (1968)
("CATV program origination offers promise as a means for increasing the number of local
outlets for community self-expression and for augmenting the public's choice of programs and
types of service, without use of spectrum."). While considering this matter, the F.C.C. restricted
the use of commercials on local origination to protect the opportunity for UHF channels to
develop an advertising base. Id. at 506.
125. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1974). See also In re CATV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, First Report and
Order), 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969). The F.C.C. referred to local origination program transmission
as "cablecasting" as opposed to broadcasting. Id. at 223.
126. 47 C.F.R. § 76.201 (1974); CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d at 208.
127. CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d at 206 ("[long-standing principle in the television broadcast field
that one entity should not be authorized, or have interest in, more than one television channel
serving the same area").
128. Id. at 214 (F.C.C. defined significant extent as "something more than the origination
of automated services (such as time and weather, news ticker, stock ticker, etc.) and aural
services (such as music and announcements)"); 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1974).
129. CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d at 207.
130. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1974). The F.C.C. issued these requirements because, to the cable
viewer, local origination programming would be indistinguishable from broadcast programming.
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reconsideration, the F.C.C. opined that origination programming would
provide an outlet for those wishing to discuss controversial issues. 3, In its
1972 case, United States v. Midwest Video Corp. [Midwest Video Corp. I],
the Supreme Court upheld the F.C.C.'s origination rules as being "reason-
ably ancillary" to the F.C.C.'s duties under the Communications Act.12
In 1969, the same year the F.C.C. was enacting origination requirements,
it was also contemplating access requirements.' 33 The F.C.C. stated that cable
operators should be encouraged, and possibly required, to provide a common
carrier-type channel for third parties to present their own programming. 3 4
The F.C.C. explicitly stated that neither the CATV operator, private parties,
nor any governmental entity could exercise editorial control over access
channel/content. 3 In 1970, it requested comments on an access provision
that would require the cable operator to set aside separate channels for
governmental, public, leased, and "instructional" (i.e., educational) access
programming. 36
The F.C.C.'s access regulations were the culmination of an extensive
bargaining process between these private industry groups. After negotiations
between the cable industry, the broadcast industry, and the copyright
owners' 3 7 -the F.C.C. issued its 1972 Cable Television Report and Order'38
which, among other things, required all cable systems in the top 100 television
markets to set aside one channel each for public, governmental, educational,
See CA TV, 20 F.C.C.2d at 219.
For a discussion of these requirements in the broadcast field, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Apparently, these requirements have rarely been enforced
against a cable operator. See 0. SRtwPRo, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, supra note 18, at 50.
131. In re CATV Systems (Pt. 74, subpt. K, Memorandum Opinion and Order), 23 F.C.C.2d
825 (1970) (origination rule would "provide access to those willing to discuss controversial
issues") Id. at 827.
132. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) [Midwest Video Corp. 1]. Concurring in the 5-4 decision, Chief
Justice Burger stated, "[clandor requires acknowledgement ... that the Commission's position
strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by
decision of the Commission and the courts." Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
133. CATV, 20 F.C.C.2d 201. For a general review of the F.C.C.'s actions in the access
area, see Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1059-62 (8th Cir. 1978).
134. In re CATV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, First Report and Order), 20 F.C.C.2d at 202. Cable
carriers should "operate as common carriers on some channels in order to afford an outlet for
others to present programs of their own choosing." Id. at 205.
135. Id. at 207. Access channels would be "free from restriction by local, State, or Federal
authority (or by private parties)." Id. However, the F.C.C. noted that illegal lotteries and
obscenity would be prohibited on access channels. Id.
136. In re CATV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 24
F.C.C.2d 580, 587 (1970).
137. See Price, supra note 48, at 560-61. These negotiations were coordinated by the Office
of Telecommunications Policy ("OTP"). The OTP, which is located in the Executive Office
of the President, assists the President in developing communications policy. Barrow, OTP and
F.C.C.: Role of the Presidency and the Independent Agency in Communications, 43 U. Cu.
L. Rav. 291, 292 (1974).
138. 1972 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141 (1972).
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and leased access.' 39 Because most cable systems had no more than a 12
channel capacity at the time, the F.CC. also required some operators to
rebuild their systems up to 20 channels to assure space for the required
access channels. 140 The F.C.C. felt it had to mandate access provisions rather
than rely on the market forces of supply and demand .'4 The F.C.C. stated
that the access requirements furthered national communication goals by
providing new outlets for community expression, promoting television pro-
gram diversity, advancing educational television, and granting local govern-
ments a powerful tool.1 42
139. 36 F.C.C.2d at 192; 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1974). These access rules were applicable to
all new cable systems operational as of March 31, 1972, in the top 100 television markets. 36
F.C.C.2d at 197. Systems already in existence had five years to comply. 36 F.C.C.2d at 197;
47 C.F.R. § 76.251(c) (1974). The F.C.C. also set up a formula for cable operators to determine
when they had to add more access channels. 36 F.C.C.2d at 192. Expansion would occur when
the available access channels were "in use during 80 percent of the weekdays . . ., for 80
percent of the time during any consecutive three-hour period for six weeks running." 36
F.C.C.2d at 192; 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(8) (1974).
Beyond access provisions, the report also dealt with distant broadcast signal carriage, pay
television regulation, channel capacity requirements and various technical standards. Id. See
also S. Pip. 67, supra note 7, at 8-9 (describing new regulations). Apparently the distant
broadcast signal and pay television regulations were part of the negotiated deal between the
cable, broadcast, and copyright industry, while the access, channel capacity and technical
provisions were not. Price. supra note 48, at 561.
140. 36 F.C.C.2d at 189-90.
141. At a later date, the Eighth Circuit summarized the F.C.C.'s rationale for this decision:
(1) cable television is new and evolving; (2) availability of cable channels for
dissemination of information is even newer; (3) demand for access services is a
function of community awareness of their existence; (4) awareness and full utilization
of cable's potential requires time; (5) some older systems have provided minimal
access on a voluntary basis or no access; (6) in those communities awareness has
not had opportunity or time to develop; (7) if its requirements resulted in blank
channels, it believed that would shorten the time to realize the full potential for
access services, because blank channels are visible and continuing inducements to
be filled; (8) it considered that true for the channel user and the system operator;
(9) if it required the system operator to provide access channels, he could be
expected to encourage their use; (10) if it now altered its ntles to reflect existing
demand for access services, it would raise a barrier to growth of that demand and
a distinction to new services "we expect of cable."
Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1033 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing In re Cable TV
Channel Capacity (Pt. 76, § 76.251), 53 F.C.C.2d 784, 787-88 (1975)).
Despite the F.C.C.'s access mandate, it allowed communities to "experiment" with various
types of access provisions-such as program funding, number of channels and access studio
management, Compare In re Application of Arlington Telecommunications Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d
757 (1975) (allowed designation of more than one channel for certain access umbrellas) and In
re Application of Complete Channel TV, Inc., 34 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1372 (1975) (allowed
access facilities to be funded partially by local government) with In re Open Channels, 58
F.C.C.2d 1216 (1975) (disallowed direct funding of third-party nonprofit access foundation
with franchise fee funds paid by cable operator to local government).
142. 1972 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 190. According to the F.C.C.,
access requirements furthered the "fundamental goals of [the] national communications struc-
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The public access channel would be available for noncommercial program-
ming and provided without charge on a first-come, first-served nondiscrim-
inatory basis. 4 The F.C.C. also required that the cable operator promulgate
rules which declared the nondiscriminatory nature of access, and proscribed
programming containing advertising material, lottery information, and ob-
scene or indecent matter.'" While recognizing that certain risks were inherent
in open access, the F.C.C. nevertheless expressly stated that the cable op-
erator "must not in any way censor or exercise program content control of
any kind over" public access programming.' 4 The F.C.C. opined that the
cable operator would not likely be liable for access programming because
the system did not exercise any editorial control over the content of the
channel. 46 It was unnecessary for the F.C.C. to impose the fairness and
ture" by "the opening of new outlets for local expression, the promotion of diversity in
television programming, the advancement of educational and instructional television, and
increased informational services of local governments." Id.
Public access channels offered "a practical opportunity to participate in community dialogue
through a mass medium," educational access promised "greater community involvement in
school affairs," and governmental access gave "maximum latitude for use by local govern-
ments." Id. at 191.
143. Id. at 190-91 (cable operator could charge production costs to access user).
144. 36 F.C.C.2d at 194; 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(1 1) (1974). See also G. GmLaSP'i, supra note
7, at 6-7 (description of access procedure requirements). See generally National Cable Television
Association, Guidelines for Access: A Report by NCTA (Aug. 1972) (model access procedures
developed by cable lobby), reprinted in substance in R. Kzsmrrr, supra note 47, at 59-69;
Shapiro, Access, reprinted in CuaTt DEVELOPmES iN CATV 1981 193-97 (1981) ("Model
Public Access Programming Rules").
As one commentator noted, the first-come, first-served formula is a "weak prescriptive
standard that leaves the cable operator with little guidance to solve a wide range of practical
problems." LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diversity, 42 FonnnAM
L. REv. 25, 103 (1973). Potential problems include:
[Hiow the applications for time are to be made, how access time is to be allocated
among a surfeit of users, how and what type of production facilities are to be
provided, how to provide advance notice of presentation, how to implement the
operator's duty to prevent obscenity and lotteries without assuming control over
the content, and how to resolve disputes arising from the implementation of the
rules.
Id. at 103 n.440. See also Note, Cablecasting: A Myth or Reality-Authority of the Federal
Communications Commission to Regulate Local Program Origination of Cable Television-An
Evaluation of the Commission's Cablecasting Rules After United States v. Midwest Video
Corporation, 26 Ruroaas L. Rav. 804, 832 (1973) (discussing potential problems relating to
cable operator's responsibility to promulgate access rules and procedures).
145. 36 F.C.C.2d at 194; 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(9) (1974). The F.C.C. did mention the
possible future use of "lock switches" to allow cable subscribers to cut off undesired access
programming. rd.
146. 36 F.C.C.2d at 195. However, the discrepancy between the prohibition against editorial
control and the requirement that lottery, obscene, and indecent programming not be shown led
to some confusion among cable operators. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1058.
The F.C.C. attempted to clarify these two opposing dictates in a 1976 Clarification, 59 F.C.C.2d
984 (1976). There, the F.C.C. stated that once the cable operator, based on the access user's
prior history or for any other reason, is on notice that "questionable material may be included
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equal time doctrines on access channels because, unlike broadcast channels,
the availability of these channels was to be unrestricted and guaranteed.' 47
In 1974, the F.C.C. deleted its rule requiring certain cable operators to
originate their own programming. 4  Because of the general economic down-
turn of the early 1970's' 49 and an over-optimistic assessment of origination's
viewer appeal, the F.C.C. concluded that the mandatory origination scheme
would not be the most effective method for providing an outlet for local
viewpoints. 5 0 Instead, it stated that it could best accomplish its goal of
fostering local expression through the use of access channels. 5' Although
the cable operator no longer had to originate programming, the system
would still have to maintain cablecasting equipment for access users.'52
In 1976, however, the F.C.C. restructured and liberalized its access re-
quirements and timetables. 3 It extended, until 1986, the deadline for existing
on a program," he should take "appropriate" steps, including pre-screening the program. Id.
at 985. The F.C.C. further recommended that the cable operator schedule "distasteful" pro-
gramming at hours that "would tend to minimize its exposure to children." Id. This recom-
mendation was made despite the F.C.C.'s recognition that "[tihere is no Constitutional safeguard
against unpleasantness." Id. One commentator has suggested that this clarification was an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Meyerson, The Right to Speak, the Right to Hear, and the
Right Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/Pornography Debate (to be
published in U. MicH. J.L. REF. 1989) [hereinafter Meyerson, Rights).
147. 36 F.C.C.2d at 196. This rationale was reiterated in In re Program Origination by Cable
TV Systems (Pt. 76, subpt. 0), 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1103 (1974). Some commentators feel that
the availability of access channels could lead to the elimination of the "fairness" doctrine for
broadcast channels as well. See Emerson, Legal Foundation of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1, 11; Price, supra note 48, at 551; Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV,
11 HAv. J. ON LEaos. 629, 647 (1974). Cf. CA~anlaT Coposrr-raE oN CAB .E TV, supra note 46,
at 38; H. DoRwicK & J. LYLE, supra note 95, at 24-25 (1971 experiment allowing political
candidates to use public access channels as a forum; authors conclude equal time and fairness
doctrines unnecessary because all candidates had free access). But see Barrow, Program Reg-
ulation in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L. Rlv. 515, 534 (1975)
("[Tlhe public access channel is available on a first-come, first-served basis to any person for
expression on any subject. Hence, there is dto procedure for ensuring that all sides of contro-
versial issues will be ventilated, or that opposing political candidates will be heard before
elections.").
One commentator has noted the inconsistency in requiring adherence to the "fairness"
doctrine on local origination channels, see supra note 130, due to the indistinguishable nature
of local origination and broadcast programming, and not requiring the "fairness" doctrine for
access channels, which are just as indistinguishable. Simmons, supra at 651.
148. In re Program Origination by Cable TV Systems (Pt. 76, subpt. G), 49 F.C.C.2d 1090
(1974).
149. See Id. at 1094.
150. Id. at 1104. Many origination advocates countered that the failure of origination was
not due to lack of viewer interest, but rather due to the "minimal efforts by the operator to
take advantage of, solicit, or even accommodate the program production creativity and talent
available in the community." Id. at 1095.
151. Id. at 1099. Cable operators that voluntarily continued to operate a local origination
channel still had to comply with the equal time and fairness doctrines. Id. at 1109; 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.205-209 (1976). This requirement continues today. 47 C.F.R. § 76.205-209 (1987).
152. 49 F.C.C.2d at 1106.
153. In re Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements (Pt. 76, § 76.251), 59 F.C.C.2d 294
(1976).
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systems to comply with the access and channel capacity requirements. 5 4
Some cable operators could also combine access channels until access users
began to utilize the available time fully or the operator increased the system's
channel capacity. -' Although the F.C.C. still believed that access channels
were an important outlet for expression, 5 6 it recognized that the prior
estimates of access impact may have been exaggerated. 7
In 1979, the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory access rules
because the requirements were beyond the jurisdiction of the F.C.C.. 58 In
F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp. [Midwest Video Corp. II], the Court con-
cluded that the access rules imposed common carrier obligations on cable
operators which were beyond the F.C.C.'s power under the Communications
Act. "' 9 The Court distinguished the earlier Midwest Video Corp. I opinion
because the access requirements, unlike the origination rules at issue in
Midwest Video Corp. , abrogated the cable operator's control over the
composition of their programming content.'6
The F.C.C. later deleted the access requirements altogether. 6' The F.C.C.
also reiterated its position that it would not apply equal time and fairness
154. Id. at 318-24; 47 C.F.R. § 76.252(b) (1976).
155. Id. at 311-18; 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(b) & (c) (1976). The F.C.C. also modified the
composition of cable systems coming under the access requirements. Now, all systems with
more than 3,500 subscribers were covered, not cable systems in the top 100 television markets
as originally set out. 59 F.C.C.2d at 299-305; 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1976).
156. 59 F.C.C.2d at 296. The F.C.C. continued to believe the access could result in:
the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion of diversity
in television programming, act in some measure to restore a sense of community
to cable subscribers and a sense of openness and participation to the video medium,
aid in the functioning of democratic institutions, and improve the informational
and educational communications resources of cable television communities.
Id.
157. Id. at 296. ("overall impact ... of these channels ... may have been exaggerated in
the past."). But see In re Major Market Cable TV Systems (Pt. 76, § 76.251(a)(l)-(a)(8)), 54
F.C.C.2d 207, 222 (1975) (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring) ("the potential uses for access channels
are just beginning to materialize and alternative programming to fill those channels is beginning
to veritably gush from colleges and other private video groups").
158. F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also Midwest Video Corp.
v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 1978) ("much of the Commission's cable-
regulating has involved the planting of new and dramatic seeds of regulation, based on soaring,
euphoric predictions (some from cable owners) of great things to come from cable television,
seeds which had to be plowed under, when germination failed in the bright sunlight of
commercial, economic, and technological reality .... (B]ut we deal here with the Federal
Communications Commission, not the Federal First Amendment Commission."), aff'd, 440
U.S. 689 (1979); id. at 1045 ("jurisdiction is not acquired through the visions of Valhalla");
cf. Home Box Office v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (particular pay cable television
regulations beyond F.C.C.'s jurisdiction); S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 9 (listing other early
F.C.C. cable television rules either eliminated or struck down).
159. 440 U.S. at 701-02. Cf. National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 533
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (striking down, on similar grounds, the F.C.C.'s preemption of state
common carrier regulations over the use of cable system leased access channels for nonvideo
communications).
160. 440 U.S. at 700.
161. In re Cable TV Access Channel Rules (Pt. 76, § 76.251), 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
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doctrine requirements to any access channels the cable operator voluntarily
provided. 62 Finally, the F.C.C. seemed to indicate that the content control
restrictions as to lotteries and obscenity would no longer apply to access
programming. 63 Despite the Midwest Video Corp. II holding, cable operators
continued to provide access and local origination service, and in some cases,
increased efforts." 4
2. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
Congressional action on cable television regulation finally arrived in 1984
with the passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (1984
Cable Act)."' The 1984 Cable Act grew out of cable television legislation
that Senator Barry Goldwater had introduced every year from 1979 until
1983.'6 The Cable Act amended the Communications Act of 1934, the
F.C.C.'s framework for regulating the electronic communications industry."67
162. Id. at 148.
163. Id. ("The specific content control rules pertaining to lotteries, obscenity, and sponsorship
identification we will continue to apply only to programming which is subject to system operator
editorial control.") (emphasis added).
164. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 287 (statement of Trygve Myhren,
chairman and chief executive officer, American Television and Communications Corp.); 1982
Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 220, 255 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler,
president, National Cable Television Association).
Cable companies often use access as a "public relations" tool to attract new subscribers. See
1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 220 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler,
president, National Cable Television Association); G. Gn.mLspm, supra note 7, at 80. Lucrative
access promises will also garner a cable company more franchise agreements with cities. Miller
& Beals, supra note 5, at 113 n.124 (cite to National Cable Television Association report that
notes valuable marketing role access provides). TV Shows Made by People Like You, supra
note 56, at 81. For more on cable franchising, see infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
165. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (West Supp.
1985). Recall that earlier attempts to pass cable television legislation had failed. See supra note
116. See also M. HAMURO, supra note 8, § 6.05[3] (in 1976, the House conducted hearings on
the potential regulation of obscenity on cable television, particularly access channels).
166. Sibary, supra note 16, at 400. The 1981 bill, S.898, as reported to the Senate floor,
prevented local governments from regulating cable rates and from requiring cable operators to
provide leased access channels. See Miller & Beals, supra note 5, at 85 n.l. A subsequent bill,
S.2172, was not brought to the full Senate for a vote before adjournment that year. S. REP.
67, supra note 7, at 13. Goldwater's 1983 bill, S.66, was "virtually identical" to S.2172. Id.
After S.66 passed the Senate, the House companion bill, H.R.4103, comprised the House
amendment to S.66. 130 Cong. Rec. S14285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984), reprinted in U.S.CODF
Coo. NmD ADMIN. NEWS 4738 (statement of Sen. Packwood). The Senate then adopted, with
minor modification, H.R.4103 along with the House Report. Id.; Meyerson, The Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543,
547 n.22 (1985) [hereinafter Meyerson, Coaxial Wires] (House Report, written when Act was
nearly in final form, is best statement of legislative intent of Act). Both of these substantially
differed from the original Senate bill, particularly as to access provisions. See infra notes 203-
09 and accompanying text.
167. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 19, 39, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4656, 4676, 4738.
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Congress promulgated the 1984 Cable Act during a time of public disil-
lusionment with cable television's potential. Consumers and legislators felt
the "blue sky" promises'" of cable had been exaggerated, due to the
municipalities and cable companies created by the unrealistic expectations of
cable's services. 69 As one commentator put it, cable television "was supposed
to enrich bankrupt cities, bring ballet to the balletomane, challenge the
power and influence of AT&T, make our streets secure, disalienate youth,
and deliver the paper in the morning.' ' 70
This overpromising was a product of the franchising system,' whereby a
city would authorize a cable company, usually exclusively, to utilize public
property for the construction of the physical plant necessary to operate the
cable system. 72 These bidding contests'7 usually resulted in local governments
demanding concessions from the winning cable company that had no relation
168. An early description of the "blue sky" nature of cable was given by an F.C.C.
Commissioner in 1976, who, in describing some of the F.C.C.'s cable rules, stated, "[the
requirements were the product of expectations generated in cable's go-go years when the benefits
of cable were sold as peddlers once sold Lydia Pinkham's Vegetable Compound, a veritable
elixir for the ills of our time." In re Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements (Pt. 76, §
76.251), 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 330 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
169. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 21, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4658. See also McGrew,
Whose Right Is Righter?, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 1982, at 332 (comparing cable television
representatives to railroad barons of the late 19th century "promising all manner of marvels
to all types of communities"); Wines, Cable Companies Fall Victim to Overpromises, Com-
petition for Viewers, NAT'L J., Feb. 18, 1984, at 314 (same).
170. Price, supra note 48, at 552. See also CABINET CoUoTrE ON CABLE TV, supra note
46, at 15-16 (cable television cannot be treated like "an electronic genie" or a "modern day
Rosetta stone capable of unraveling the complex problems facing this society"). For a sample
of some of the "blue sky" expectations of cable television, see supra note 23.
171. The franchising process usually begins with the local government issuing a request for
proposals ("RFP"). H. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 23, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4660. In the
RFP, the city will set out the requirements a cable operator must meet in order to gain an
exclusive franchise. Id. An RFP typically contains requirements for "channel capacity; the
services to be provided over a system, and the rates for such services; the level of the franchise
fee to be paid the city; the availability of channels for community access and access by for-
profit program suppliers not affiliated with the cable operator; minority and local participation
and ownership of the cable system; methods of enforcing the franchise; the length of the
franchise and procedures for renewing the franchise upon expiration." Id. The winner of the
RFP bidding receives the franchise, defined as "an initial authorization ... issued by a
franchising authority, whether such authorization is designated as a franchise, permit, license,
resolution, contract, certificate, agreement, or otherwise, which authorizes the construction or
operation of a cable system." 1984 CABLE ACT, § 522(8). See H. REP. 934, supra note 7, at
19, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4656 ("municipal franchise granted to cable operator specifies
nature of cable system to be constructed, service to be provided, and rate which may be
charged"); id. at 44-45, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4681-82 (definition of franchise). See also
S. REp. 67, supra note 7, at 45 (Senate bill 66 definition of franchise, equivalent to 1984 Cable
Act provision).
172. S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 6. The premise for this exercise of local jurisdiction over
cable systems was "its use of local streets and rights of way." Id.
173. See also Ronka, supra note 52, at 11 ("The recent rounds of franchising fury have
frequently been described as a modern day gold rush.").
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to the provision of cable service. Concessions such as the paying of millions
of dollars in up-front money to repair a sewage system,' 74 the planting of
20,000 trees, 17 the provision of free service to handicapped residents, 7 6 the
computerization of the local public library's card catalog,'" and the contri-
bution of money to a local drug abuse program are among the most
notorious. 78 Local governments also demanded more and more access chan-
nels, studios, and equipment despite the under-utilization and high cost of
existing facilities." 9 Cable operators were to blame as well. The franchising
process caused cable companies to overpromise in order to receive the
exclusive franchise, then once the city granted the franchise to the operator
the terms would be renegotiated. 19 Other miscalculations that exacerbated
the cable operators' dilemma included inaccurate estimates of the costs of
maintaining elaborate urban franchises, exaggerated expectations of sub-
scriber demand, and unrealistic estimates of the potential of new services. 8'
To further aggravate cable's image problem, the early 1980's brought cable
television its first taste of competition from new technologies 82 such as
174. Smith, Million-Dollar Wands, EsQuRE, Jan. 1981, at 16 (occurred in San Antonio,
Texas).
175. Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 132-33 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler,
president, National Cable Television Association).
176. Id. (in Baltimore, Maryland).
177. Id.
178. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 49 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler,
president, National Cable Television Association) (Miami, Florida, required cable operator to
contribute $200,000 a year to city's drug abuse program).
179. See generally H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 21, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4658;
House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 61 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president,
National Cable Television Association) (increasing demands for access facilities); 1982 Sen.
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 220 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president,
National Cable Television Association) (same).
F.C.C. regulations, in particular access requirements, proved expensive for cable companies
and cable consumers. See 1983 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 209 n. II (statement
of Mountain States Legal Foundation) (cost of regulatory burdens, including access, averages
$5.60 per month per subscriber); 1982 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 255 (statement
of Thomas E. Wheeler, president, National Cable Television Association) (citing study which
found that "22 percent of the consumers' monthly payment went to direct regulatory costs
[including] public access"); Nadel, Editorial Freedom: Editors, Retailers, and Access to the
Mass Media, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 213, 237 n. 117 (1987) (cost of regulatory measures approximately
$240 to $340 per subscriber over life of franchise); Note, Access to Cable, Natural Monopoly,
and the First Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 1663, 1683 n.104 (1986) (30% average price
increase due to cable regulations) [hereinafter Note, Access to Cable].
180. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 21-22, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4659 ("In
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, the cable operator awarded the franchise sought to
renegotiate the term of the franchise less than eight months after it was awarded and before
construction had barely commenced.").
181. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 21, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4658.
182. The Senate expressly recognized the adverse effects of these competing technologies
during its deliberations. See S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 20. But see id., at 45 (minority views
of Mr. Lautenberg) ("As far as I can tell, however, no technology yet matches cable in offering
the diversity and potential range of services from a single source. Nor have I seen any great
body of evidence that cable is fast becoming a threatened industry.").
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subscription television (STV),' s3 satellite master antenna television (SMATV),1 4
video cassettes and discs, low-power television (LPTV),111 direct broadcast
satellite (DBS) service, 8 6 multi-point distribution (MDS),'8 and multi-channel
MDS(MMDS)I8 s systems. While most of these alternative technologies suffer
from low channel capacity and a high cost per channel, as a group they had
a competitive impact. 8 9 All of these factors were considered by Congress
during the 1984 Cable Act debates.
Like the extensive cable regulations resulting from the F.C.C.'s 1972
Report,'19 the Cable Act was primarily the product of compromise. The chief
negotiators in this round of cable regulation were the National League of
Cities ("NLC") and the National Cable Television Association ("NCTA"),
the lobbying organizations for local governments and the cable industry
respectively.' 9' In fact, Senator Goldwater stated that it would have been
"difficult or impossible to achieve final passage of cable legislation without
some sort of agreement between the Nation's cities and the cable industry."' 9
183. STV broadcasts a scrambled signal over the UHF band (channels 14-84), the subscriber
purchases a decoder to receive the signal at his television set. Sibary, supra note 16, at 385.
See also M. SPRAGUE, NEw COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA AND PUBc BROADCASO: IMPACTS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 9, 10 (1980) ("[T]he drawback to STY is its limited channel capacity. A franchisee
is limited to one channel of programming per television station.").
184. SMATV is similar to a cable television operation, but without using public right-of-
ways. SMATV systems, or private cable, are generally located in large apartment buildings.
Sibary, supra note 16, at 386-87.
185. LPTV stations are broadcast stations with a shorter broadcasting radius. Id. at 385.
186. DBS licensee picks up programming from a satellite transponder and then transmits it
to small rooftop earth stations. Id. at 387. DBS subscribers need a "converter as well as an
earth station to receive DBS signals .... [A] tuner would allow the subscriber to select from
among the various DBS programs." M. SPRAGUE, supra note 183, at 17.
187. MDS is basically "broadcasting at microwave frequencies" and entails the use of a
microwave antenna. Sibary, supra note 16, at 386. An MDS licensee is a common-carrier who
provides the transmission hardware for a customer's programming. M. SPRAGu E, supra note
183, at 13.
188. MMDS is the same as MDS except more than one channel is available.
189. See, e.g., 1983 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 214 (statement of Cable
Television Access Coalition) (notes limited channel capacity of most competing technologies);
Miller & Beals, supra note 5, at 96 n.44 (other media cannot offer variety and number of
channels received through cable; nor significant potential for two-way user interaction); Wines,
supra note 169, at 318 ("Many experts-and just about all cable system operators-argue that
a metropolitan cable-TV system would eventually win any head-to-head contest with competing
technologies.").
190. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 13-14 (description of early NLC/NCTA
negotiations); id. at 14-15 (letter from NLC and NCTA endorsing cable legislation); 130 CoNG.
REc. H10440 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rinaldo) (notes agreement of NLC,
NCTA, and U.S. Conference of Mayors).
192. 130 CoNG. REC. S14283 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
Congress' reliance on the cable industry and the cities to negotiate a cable bill was criticized
because (1) the process lacked public participation, and (2) the cable industry was only interested
in protecting its government-created monopoly. Sibary, supra note 16, at 403. Cf. 130 CoNG.
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Congress did not pass the 1984 Cable Act hastily; it was the result of
three years of hearings, discussions, and negotiations. 93 The 1984 Cable Act
was an effort to update the outdated Communications Act of 1934 and bring
the law in line with the new information age. 94 The House Report on the
1984 Cable Act ("House Report") noted that the "FCC policies in the 1960's
and early 1970's unfairly inhibited the growth and development of cable."'"
Further inhibition would be avoided because the 1984 Cable Act established
a comprehensive national policy that clearly set out which level of government
was to regulate the various aspects of cable television.'9
The 1984 Cable Act was designed to achieve six goals: establish a national
cable policy; establish fair franchising procedures and standards; establish
REc. H10436 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) ("The legislation contains
several provisions to provide the industry with the certainty and stability it needs to make large
financial investments to construct and operate cable systems."). One industry-watcher was
quoted as stating, "[t]he present situation is a remarkable delegation to private parties with
Congress saying to the cities and cable industry, 'sit down and decide what you want, and we
will pass it.' " Sibary, supra note 16, at 403.
Apparently, the NCTA/NLC negotiations hit a snag after the Supreme Court's decision in
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). Brenner & Price, supra note 112, at
41. In Capital Cities, the Supreme Court held that the F.C.C.'s comprehensive regulation over
signal carriage by cable television systems preempted Oklahoma from requiring in-state cable
operators to delete all advertisements for alcoholic beverages contained in out-of-state signals
the system carried. 467 U.S. at 716. The cable industry surmised that it may be better to rely
on a deregulatory, preemptive F.C.C. to rid itself of burdensome regulations, rather than the
legislative process. Brenner & Price, supra note 112, at 41. See also 130 CoNo. Rac. H10444
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984). During a house discussion, Rep. Markey stated:
[e]veryone also should understand that if the House falls to pass a Federal cable
policy, then our cities will be robbed of their control over cable TV. The era of
deregulation, affirmed by the F.C.C. and the Supreme Court, has hit cable regu-
lation with a crippling force. One result of the deregulation mania is that unless
Congress enacts a cable bill, the Supreme Court will do it for us. I can assure you
of one thing: The cities and the consumer are not included In the Supreme Court-
F.C.C. view of cable policy.
Id. (statement of Rep. Markey). Nevertheless, after final "skirmishes" over equal employment
opportunity and public participation in franchise renewal proceedings, the NCTA again sup-
ported the cable legislation. Brenner & Price, supra note 112, at 41.
193. See 130 CoNo. Rc. H10435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth) (1984
Cable Act "is a carefully crafted set of compromises that has emerged from over 3 years of
hearings, discussions and negotiations by members of the Committee oil Energy and Commerce,
and representatives of the cities, the cable industry, and many others").
194. Id.
195. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 22, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4659. See also S. RP.
67, supra note 7, at 5 (F.C.C. efforts to update its rules "barely have kept pace with technological
innovation and consumer interest"); 130 CoNo. REc. H10445 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Tauke) ("Under the current law the cable systems of this country have not prospered
as they should.").
196. 130 CoNG. REc. H10435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). For examples
and descriptions of local and State cable regulations, see In re Duplicative and Excessive Over-
Regulation-CATV (Pt. 76), 54 F.C.C.2d 855, 856-57 (1975); Albert, The Federal and Local
Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 501 (1977); Meyerson, Coaxial Wires,
supra note 166, at 551 n.53 (1985).
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guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority over cable;
assure that cable provides the widest diversity of information sources and
services; establish a fair franchise renewal process; and minimize unnecessary
cable regulations. 97 The Act was an attempt to satisfy all relevant groups,
and one commentator described the 1984 Cable Act's multiple purposes as
a balancing of the rights of the cable operator, the local government and
the public.' g9
197. In full, the six purposes are:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the growth and
development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive
to the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with
respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide the
widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable operators
against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and proposal
for future performance meet the standards established by this subchapter; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary regu-
lation that would impose an undue burden on cable systems.
1984 CABL Acr § 521.
Senate Bill 66, the predecessor to House Bill 4103, listed only four purposes:
(1) establish a national policy concerning broadband telecommunications and to
encourage a competitive environment for the growth and development of broadband
telecommunications;
(2) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local regulatory
authority;
(3) allow cable systems to be responsive to the needs and interests of the public on
an equal basis without competitive disadvantage with other providers of telecom-
munications services; and
(4) eliminate government regulation in order to prevent the imposition of an
unnecessary economic burden on cable systems in their provision of service to the
public.
S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 34. These purposes reflected the Senate committee's belief that
"the marketplace forces, rather than Government regulation, should govern and prevail." Id.
at 11, 17 ("free and open marketplace competition In the provision of cable can only develop
if the cable industry is free of unnecessary and burdensome restrictions which place cable at a
competitive disadvantage with other providers of similar services"). The Senate also believed
that many of the current cable regulations were unnecessary "due to demonstrated expertise
on the part of the industry itself, and to increased understanding about, and familiarity with,
the Industry on the part of state and local officials, and potential cable subscribers." Id. at
11. The Senate apparently believed that this new-found "expertise" would ameliorate the effects
of the "blue sky" overpromising and franchise gouging discussed earlier. See supra notes 168-
71 and accompanying text.
After the House passed House Bill 4103, the Senate adopted the purposes in the House Bill,
but amended the fourth and fifth purpose and added a sixth to reflect its "marketplace"
mentality. See statement by Sen. Robt. Packwood, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONO. AND ADMIN.
NEws at 4738.
198. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 621 (1984 Cable Act's purposes described
as a "delicate balance between the rights of the cable operator to pursue their business, the
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Access provisions were designed to advance the purpose contained in
section 521(4) of the 1984 Cable Act, to "assure that cable communications
provide and are encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity of
information and sources and services to the public."'' 9 In one sense, this
diversity would come from an increase in the aggregate number of channels
available to viewers. Cable's large channel capacity has the potential of
delivering to subscribers over 100 channels of video programming-much
more than the five to ten channels traditionally delivered by local broad-
casters.200 Additionally, diversity would be achieved through increasing the
number of potential speakers. Access requirements would provide individuals
and groups who were previously denied access to an electronic media the
opportunity to add their ideas and voice to the marketplace.' °  In the House
rights of the franchising authority to regulate the interests of their communities, and the rights
of individuals in what is potentially the most important communications technology area").
199. 1984 CABLE AcT, § 521(4). One cable industry spokesperson stated, "[i]t is ironic...
that some would look at cable and say that it is not enough diversity; cable must be subject
to access requirements that will not be imposed on those technologies] who offer less." House
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 62 (statement of Thomas E. Wheeler, president, National
Cable Television Association).
200. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 292 (statement of Rep. Wirth)
("With its abundant channel capacity, cable has great potential for helping to assure that the
electronic marketplace of ideas has not only many voices, but many tongues as well."); H.R.
REP. 934, supra note 6, at 19, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4656 (same); 130 Como. Rac. H 10445
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Tauke) ("Our first amendment responsibility is to
try to ensure that as many people have access to as broad and as diverse a choice of viewing
possibilities on their television sets as we can reasonably give to them."). Although diversity is
generally viewed as a worthy goal, one commentator has suggested a potential downside:
[ilmagine a world in which there is a sufficient number of TV channels to keep
each group, and in particular the less literate and tolerant members of groups,
wholly occupied? Will members of such groups ever again be able to talk mean-
ingfully to one another? Will they ever obtain at least some information through
the same filters so that their images of reality will overlap to some degree? Are we
in danger of creating by electrical communications such diversity within society as
to remove the commonness of experience necessary for human communication,
political stability, and, indeed, nationhood itself.
Baran, supra note 46, at 249.
201. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4667 (groups and
individuals who have not had access media will be provided with opportunity to become sources
of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas). See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra
note 42, at 292 (statement of Rep. Wirth) ("Access provides an effective means of meeting the
goal, guaranteeing that a diversity of viewpoints can be heard, without relying on rules or
regulations concerning cable program content."); H.R. REP 934, supra note 6, at 30, reprinted
in USCCAN, at 4667 (a requirement of third-party access to cable systems will mean more
information for public-the fundamental goal of the first amendmentl; 130 CoNo. REc. H10445
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) ("this bill guarantees to American citizens
as much of the diversity of programming and the beautiful advantages that cable offers by ...
giving those Americans the chance to fully participate in this beautiful new instrument of
communications").
Some cable industry spokespersons asserted that access, especially commercial access, would
result in a diminution of variety rather than in a promotion of it. See House Subcomm.
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Report, public access channels were described as the "video equivalent of
the speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet" which
would "contribute to an informed citizenry by bringing local schools into
the home, and by showing public local government at work." 202
Public access' ride through Congress was rocky. In early versions of Senate
cable legislation, communities could require only cable systems with over 20
channels to provide access-with a ceiling of ten percent of the channel
capacity being set aside for public, governmental, educational, and leased
access.203 The 1982 Senate Bill provided that a cable operator may offer to
designate channels for public, educational, governmental, or other users. 204
The local government could only require governmental access. 2° Consistent
with its "marketplace" inclination, 206 the Senate set out these limited access
provisions "reluctantly, and with some misgivings," commenting that the
cable operator's special access obligation would cease when new outlets for
this type of programming became available. 207
The 1984 Cable Act, however, provides that a franchising authority2°s may
require that channel capacity be set aside for public, educational, or gov-
ernmental use. 20° Congress did not define "public access" but apparently
Hearings, supra note 42, at 62. In the House subcommittee hearings, Thomas E. Wheeler, the
president of the National Cable Television Association, quoting a study by economists Kenneth
Baseman and Bruce Owen, stated:
[bjriefly put, increased concentration of control over the "channels" available for
media distribution will tend to increase product variety. The reason is fairly simple.
An owner of two competing "channels" will be less likely than two independent
owners of those channels to offer the same kind of programming. The joint owner
will feel that duplicating program types will add little to his total audience, and
therefore will be inclined to offer an altogether different kind of program. An
independent owner of the second channel, on the other hand, will be more inclined
to run a program type similar to that of the first channel, if a larger audience can
be attracted by taking a share of the first program's audience than by offering an
entirely different kind of programming.
Id. See also id. at 253-54 (statement of Trygve Myhren, chairman and chief executive officer,
American Television and Communications Corp.) (attacks notion that commercial access will
breed diversity).
202. H.R. REp. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4667.
203. See, e.g., 1983 Sen. Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 209 (statement of Mountain
States Legal Foundation) (noting limited access provisions); id. at 177 (statement of Richard
H. Hirsch, secretary of communications, U.S. Catholic Conference) (same); 1982 Sen. Sub-
comm. Hearings, supra note 23, at 384 (statement of Hon. S. Tony Jordon, council member,
City of Raleigh, North Carolina) (same).
204. S. Rep. 67, supra note 7, at 38 (emphasis added). See also id. at 28 (cable operator
may offer, but may not be required to provide, channel capacity for access uses).
205. See id. at 21.
206. See supra note 196.
207. S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 22.
208. The 1984 Cable Act defines "franchising authority" as "any governmental entity
empowered by Federal, State, or local law to grant a franchise." 1984 CABLE ACT § 522(9).
209. 1984 CABLE ACT § 531(b) (emphasis added). If the franchise was later modified, the
1984 Cable Act forbade the cable operator from modifying "any requirement for services
relating to public, educational, or governmental access." Id. § 545(e).
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intended that access continue its first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory
tradition.210 The 1984 Cable Act also set up provisions for leased or com-
mercial access. 21' It did not resolve whether cable systems access channels
were to be treated like common carriers.212 In promulgating access provisions,
Congress was aware of the first amendment concerns in allowing third-party
access to channels operated by the cable operator.2 1 Nevertheless, Congress
believed that the access provisions were permissible content-neutral, nar-
rowly-drawn, structural regulations. 214
The access provision of the 1984 Cable Act also allowed the franchising
authority to require rules and procedures for the use of access channels.2 15
Giving this power to the franchising authority deviated from the prior
practice, under F.C.C. regulations, of allowing the cable operator to prom-
ulgate access rules and regulations. 216 These rules would be "traffic cop"
210. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 585 (Congress planned to continue concept
of first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory access). The 1984 Cable Act did define "public,
educational, or governmental access facilities" as "(A) channel capacity designated for public,
educational, or governmental use; and (B) facilities and equipment for the use of such channel
capacity." 1984 CABLE ACT § 522(13).
211. 1984 CABLE ACT § 532.
212. Although the 1984 Cable Act permits access requirements, the Act also provides that
"[a]ny cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason
of providing any cable service." 1984 CABLE ACT § 541(c). The Senate Report on Senate Bill
66, which forbade common carrier-type regulations, See S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 43, stated
the prohibition did "not affect ... any access channel provisions in existing franchises." Id.
at 29.
213. See H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 31-36, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4668-73.
The constitutionality of the 1984 Cable Act's access scheme will not be dealt with in this
Comment. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488.
496 (1986) (Court unwilling to decide constitutionality of various cable regulations without a
more thoroughly developed record); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571
F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983) (upholding Rhode Island mandatory access rules).
For recent articles on this topic, see Brunelli, Why Courts Should Not Use Public Forum
Doctrine Analysis in Considering Cable Operators' Claims Under the First Amendment, 24 AM.
Bus. L.J. 541 (1986); Lee, Cable Leased Access and the Conflict Among First Amendment
Rights and First Amendment Values, 35 EMoRY L.J. 563 (1986); Nadel, supra note 179; Wirth
& Cobb-Reiley, supra note 62; Comment, An Excess of Accesss: the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 and First Amendment Protection of Editorial Discretion, 8 CARDOZO L.
Rav. 317 (1986); Comment, Public Access to Cable Television and the First Amendment, 15
SEToN HALL L. REV. 96 (1984); Note, Access to Cable, supra note 179; Comment, Public
Access Channels in Cable Television: The Economic Scarcity Rationale of Berkshire v. Burke,
74 Ky. L.J. 249 (1985-86); Note, Quincy Cable, supra note 48; Note, The First Amendment
and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 22 TULSA L.J. 229
(1986).
214. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 33, 35, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4670. Examples of
other "structural" regulations of the media include "antitrust enforcement and the promulgation
of rules limiting cross-ownership of media properties in the same local market." Id. at 31,
reprinted in USCCAN, at 4668.
215. 1984 CABLE ACT § 531(b). Apparently this provision was one of the concessions the
NCTA made to the NLC during negotiations. See S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 14.
216. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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regulations, not related to the content of the programming. 1 7 Such rules
might set out the technical standards for programming, describe the proper
use of studio equipment, outline equipment training programs, or prevent
an access user from monopolizing the channel.2 8
The 1984 Cable Act's access provisions explicitly prohibit the cable op-
erator from exercising any type of editorial control over access channels. 219
The House Report stated that this provision was integral to the concept of
access channels. "0 Because the cable operator could not exercise any editorial
control over access programming, the 1984 Cable Act absolved the operator
of any civil or criminal liability arising from the programming carried on
those channels.'"
The 1984 Cable Act does provide a mechanism for cable subscribers to
avoid programming they find offensive. Section 544(d)(2)(A) provides that
if a cable subscriber wants to restrict the viewing of a channel which may
contain obscene or indecent programming, the cable operator "shall provide
217. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 587. See also R. ORJNGEL & S. BusKE,
supra note 9, at 131 (act gives local governments authority to promulgate structural regulations).
218. See generally Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 588 ("that the access channel
will be used in half-hour or hour long blocks, that some time slots will be reserved for series
programming while other slots must be used by different persons each week, and that no
individual will be able to monopolize the channels"); Van Eaton & Earley, Controversial
Programming and Access: An Outline of Basic Issues and Approaches Under the First Amend-
ment 12-13 (paper presented in Dayton, Ohio, May 13-14, 1988) ("Such rules might Include
rules designed to protect the non-commercial, local character of the access channel, to ensure
a variety of users have opportunities to use the access facilities and to protect the equipment
and facilities from abuse.").
For example, the extensive regulations for access use in St. Paul, Minnesota, contain sections
on portable 'equipment scheduling, post production equipment and facilities, studio use, portable
studio and modulator use, user sanctions, access channel time rules, certification, videotape
use, public inspection file, videotext use, shared use facilities and equipment, program playback,
rate card, maintenance, technical standards, and house, safety and security rules. Cable Access-
St. Paul, Inc. Rules and Regulations (Apr. 8, 1986, St. Paul, Minnesota). The access regulations
for Cincinnati, Ohio, include sections on access operating procedures, equipment check out/
in, editing and studio use, cablecast scheduling for single programs, cablecast scheduling for
series programming, additional plays for programs, technical requirements for cablecasting, on
site behavior, and denial of access privileges. Warner Cable of Cincinnati Access Rules and
Operating Procedures (Mar. 31, 1988, Cincinnati, Ohio).
219. 1984 CABLE ACT § 531(e) (cable operator prohibited from exercising editorial control
over any public, educational, or governmental use of access).
220. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4684.
221. 1984 CABLE ACT § 558. However, if the operator did exercise editorial control over the
content of an access program, he would be deemed a "cable programmer" pursuant to the
1984 Cable Act and open to liability. See H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 95, reprinted in
USCCAN, at 4732 (term "cable programmers" encompasses more than just the program
producer). Senate bill 66 contained a similar provision. See S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 28,
42.
This immunity is similar to that granted to broadcasters when, pursuant to the Communi-
cations Act, they are required to transmit programming submitted by certain legally qualified
political candidates. See Farmers Educ. and Coop. Union of Am., N.D. Div. v. WDAY, 360
U.S. 525 (1959).
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(by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of
a particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber.'" This
device is commonly referred to as a "lock box" or a "parental control
device" and allows a cable subscriber to block out certain signals and keep
the channel off his television set. Congress felt that a "lock box" provision
in the case of obscene or indecent programming would not infringe on the
first amendment rights of the cable operator, the cable programmer, or other
cable viewers. 2 This balancing of interests provides that, "except for ob-
scenity, the speaker shall not be silenced, the willing viewer shall receive the
programming, and the unwilling viewer shall be protected by technology,
not by the censor." Some have questioned the efficacy of the "lock box"
222. 1984 CABLE ACT § 544(d)(2)(A).
223. See Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 29-30, 35 (author also describes an "addressable
converter," which enables cable operator to block a particular channel's signal). See, e.g.,
CABINET COMMITTEE oN CABLE TV, supra note 46, at 38 (use of "scrambling codes, locked
channels, and other devices" to enable the individual to "enforce his own standards of obscenity
or violence without the need for extensive prior restraint").
224. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 70, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4707 (Congress was
primarily concerned with child viewers).
225. Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146. Notwithstanding the equal treatment of obscene and
indecent programming under the "lock box" provision, the 1984 Cable Act treats the two very
differently. While the 1984 Cable Act's only restriction on indecent programming is the lock
box provision, the Act virtually forecloses the cablecasting of obscene programming on two
fronts. Section 559 of the Act provides that "[w]hoever transmits ... any matter which is
obscene ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both." 1984 CABLE ACT § 559. Furthermore, the Act allows the franchising authority and the
cable operator to specify in the franchise that "certain cable services shall not be provided or
shall be provided subject to conditions, if such cable services are obscene or are otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution of the United States." Id. § 544(d)(1). Congress intended the
obscenity standard set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to govern the 1984 Cable
Act. H.R. REp. 934, supra note 7, at 69, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4706; S. REP. 67, supra
note 7, at 24. The Miller standard for obscenity is:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standard"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24.
After the passage of the 1984 Cable Act, the F.C.C. promulgated a rule that cable operators
could only provide lock boxes for channels over which the operator exercised editorial control,
thereby excluding lock box availability for access channels. The F.C.C. was later ordered to
delete this rule-the court commenting that the rule had "no discernible basis in the statute or
the legislative history." American Civil Liberties Union v. F.C.C., 823 F.2d 1554, 1579 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Despite the "lock box" provision of the 1984 Cable Act, many local access regulations still
prohibit indecent programming. See, e.g., Sangamon State University/Times Mirror Cable
Television of Springfield, Inc.: Access Rules § 3(g) (Springfield, Illinois, undated); Comcast:
Public Access Policies and Procedures (Indianapolis, Indiana, Sept. 1, 1988); Public Access
Channel Operating Rules: Continental Cablevision of Lansing § 103(e) (Lansing, Michigan,
undated); Scheduling Regulations, Cable 21-ACTV the Community Channel § 2.01(0 (Col-
umbus, Ohio, Feb. 12, 1986).
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alternative in light of its complexity.22
The 1984 Cable Act dramatically altered the F.C.C.'s jurisdiction to
regulate cable television.27 The F.C.C. exercises even less regulatory power
over cable systems,2 and plays a minor role in determining the future
direction of cable regulation. "9 The F.C.C.'s only involvement in access is
reviewing grievances relating to a cable operator's failure to provide com-
mercial access." 0
D. Controversial Programming
Although some cable television insiders have recognized the threat of con-
troversial programming on public access, " ' until recently such programming
was limited to New York City and was controversial only because it was
marginally obscene. Today, however, controversial programming has spread
across the country and contains material or is produced by organizations that
inflame the sensibilities of the majority of cable subscribers. The organizations
that cause the most consternation for local governments, viewers, and cable
companies include groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazis, and other notorious
"hate" groups. 2  Although the use of public access by these groups was
226. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J.,
concurring) (less than one percent of cable subscribers have purchased lock boxes due to the
unwanted complexity of the devices).
227. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 547.
228. S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 19.
229. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 551. See id. at 547 (F.C.C. now has a
sharply limited role in cable television). For review of F.C.C. responsibilities under the 1984
Cable Act, see Ross, F.C.C. Responsibilities Under the Cable Communications Policy of 1984,
reprinted in THE Naw ERA fl CATV: TE CABLE FRmcmsE PoLicY AND CommumcATONS
AcT oF 1984 7-70 (1985).
230. 1984 CABLE ACT § 532(e).
231. See, e.g., In re Reconsideration of Cable TV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, §§ 74.1107, 74.1031(c),
74.1105 (a),(b); Report and Order), 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 194 (1972) (open access carries certain
risks); In re CATV (Pt. 74, subpt. K, Memorandum Opinion and Order), 23 F.C.C.2d 825,
827 (1970) (access will allow "those willing to discuss controversial issues . . . a means of access
to the television viewer"); R. KLEnrER, supra note 47, at I (access could bring controversy
back to the television screen). But see 0. GnLEspm, supra note 7, at 70 ("There is little
indication from the various sources of information for the study that fear of pornographic,
indecent, and libelous programming will present a barrier to the viability of the [access] idea.").
232. This comment assumes that white-supremacist speech and other controversial speech
described in this section fall within the protections of the first amendment. See, e.g., Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (racist speech of Ku Klux Klan); Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (protected speech patterned after that of european fascist leaders);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (Nazi march in largely Jewish community), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010
(4th Cir. 1973) (protected "expression of racist and anti-semitic views" in public forum). This
conclusion was also reached by the National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence, see NIAPV
REPORT, supra note 27, at 3-6 ("In summary, the Cable Act and the applicable First Amendment
standards make it almost impossible to prevent the showing of racist cable programming over
a public access channel"). But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding
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foreseen years ago,233 only recently have these organizations made extensive
use of public access to espouse their messageY 4 White-supremacist program-
ming has led some communities to remove public access,'" and others to
group libel ordinance); Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amend-
ment, 17 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. Rav. 11 (1985) (asserts that properly worded group libel statute
would be constitutional).
The cablecast of racist programming would not even rise to an incitement. Such a cablecast
would parallel the facts in Brandenburg where the Klan rally was filmed and later broadcast
on the local station. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. Because the "speaker is physically removed
from his audience and the members of the audience are separated from each other,"-the
typical incitement setting-"a highly-charged atmosphere generated by a closely-packed crowd
listening to the exhortations of a forceful speaker-simply isn't present." NIAPV REPORT,
supra note 27, at 5. Cablecasting would not meet the Brandenburg standard which forbids the
government from proscribing advocacy unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
233. See, e.g., McGrew, supra note 169, at 335 ("Most New Yorkers chuckle tolerantly when
the [access) channel decides to broadcast Ugly George. One wonders, though, whether they
would remain tolerant if other channels were to feature the Nazi Hour, the Klan on the March,
kiddie porn, a real Black Mass .... ); Do-It Yourself TV, NawswEEK, Jan. 3, 1972, at 49,
50 (quoting one access advocate, "If the Nazi Party walked in, I'd have to give them time. I
wouldn't like it, but that's what public access is all about.").
234. As one white-supremacist was quoted as saying, "This public access allows us to reach
infinitely more people than leaflets do." NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 12. Unwittingly,
this white-supremacist tapped into the Nazi slogan, Sturmabtering, originally expressed by
Hitler in Mein Kampf. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Sturmabterlung was a figure of speech: "possession of the streets is the key to power
in the state." Id. (citation omitted). Modern-day white-supremacists might be updating-
Sturmabterlung in order to take possession of television, today's "key to power." Cf. Minniberg,
supra note 50, at 585 (cites studies that "indicate that while the mass media are not effective
in creating people's existing views, they are extremely effective in creating new opinions");
Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues. The Forgotten Hatf of the
Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 137, 148 n.54 (1975) [hereinafter Comment,
Obligation to Present Controversial Issues) ("The medium has enormous power to reinforce
existing opinions, to create public opinion on entirely new issues, and to influence people who
presently have no opinion. The power to influence the undecided .s especially significant, for
political elections are very often decided by a relatively small number of undecided voters.")
(citations to various studies omitted).
235. In June 1988, the Kansas City Council (Missouri) voted to amend its franchise and
cancel the city's public access channels to avoid the airing of "Klansas Kable," an access
program produced by the local Klan. National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence, Bigotry
and Cable TV: The Controversy Continues, FORUM, Sept. 1988, at 6 [hereinafter NIAPV
UPDATE]. The council planned to keep what it considered the best of public access programming
by moving it to a local origination, or community channel. That channel, however, is under
the strict editorial control of the cable operator. Id. See also The Ku Klux Klan and 'Kiansas
City Kable,' NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1988, at 21 (more background on Klan controversy in Kansas
City); Kansas City Pulls Plug on Klan Access, CmcAGo Tiautm, June 18, 1988, § I, at 4,
col. I (same). The American Civil Liberties Union and the Klan are suing the Kansas City
Council, alleging a deprivation of first amendment rights. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Kansas City, No. 89-0067-CV-W-5 (W.D.Mo. 1989); KKK, ACLU Sue City, NAT'L L.
J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 6, col. 1. They assert that the public access channel is the "modern
equivalent of a soapbox on a street comer." Id.
The Florida Klan is also producing an access program called "Florida Klan News." McCoy,
supra note 66.
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consider doing the same-often at the urging of the cable operator.2Y6
The most controversial of the white-supremacist access programs is "Race
and Reason," produced by Tom Metzger, head of the White Aryan Resis-
tance.Y3 "Race and Reason" is a series of 30-minute talk show programs
moderated by Metzger.218 The theme of the series is a call "for creation of
a separate White nation in the United States," citing the "inferiority of
Blacks and other racial minorities, the conspiracy of Jews to dominate the
U.S. government, and the superiority of Whites."2 3 9 Metzger has produced
63 episodes of "Race and Reason" and over 25 cable systems have cablecast
it.240
The access channel in Austin, Texas, was the first to cablecast "Race and
Reason" in late 1984.141 In 1987, "Race and Reason" was submitted to the
cable system in the East Bay Area of California. 2 The cable company sent
the program to its New York headquarters to allow its attorneys to preview
the show. The California system later cablecast the show at 11:30 p.m., but
preceded it with "Molly's Pilgrim," an Academy Award-winning show
produced by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.243 In the fall of
1986, "Race and Reason" hit the access channel in Pocatello, Idaho." The
access management staff, comprised of public library employees, did not
treat "Race and Reason" any differently than other shows.25 However,
Pocatello's access procedures require that programs be available for viewing
at the studio one week prior to their cablecast date.2 6 This provision helped
236. See NIAPV UPDATE, supra note 235, at 6 (Cox Cable in Spokane, Washington, and
Capitol Cablevision in Jackson, Mississippi, have urged the elimination of public access to
avoid controversial racist programming).
237. For a recent account of white-supremacist activities in the United States, including a
profile of Metzger, see Coplon, Skinhead Nation, Rou.o SToNE, Dec. 1, 1988, at 54. Metzger,
a longtime white-supremacist, is attempting to modernize his cause by attracting young Skinheads
to produce a "dynamic, hip, urban ... champion of [the] white working class." Id. at 58.
The use of cable television, particularly the production of "Race and Reason," is part of what
he calls his modernization plan.
238. NIAPV REPoRT, supra note 27, at 3.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2-3. In many cable systems, a program not locally produced needs a local
"sponsor" for it to run on public access. See infra note 329. "Race and Reason" sponsors
include individuals who have affiliations with a "variety of extremist groups including the Klan,
Aryan Nations, the American National Socialist Party, White American Skin Heads, and others,
in addition to Metzger's own White Aryan Resistance and White American Political Associa-
tion." NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 2.
241. NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
242. Id. at 7-9.
243. Id. This was an effort to "balance the message of racial hate and religious intolerance
espoused in 'Race and Reason."' Id.
244. Id. at 17-22.
245. Id. The public library staff considered, but later dismissed, the idea of producing its
own response program. Ammon, "But I'll Defend Their Right to Say It:" Racism, Response,
and the First Amendment in Pocatello, IDAHO LtERALAN, Apr. 1988, at 40, 41.
246. Ammon, supra note 245, at 40; Pocatello-Vision 12 Programming Policy (Oct. 1, 1987,
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establish a routine by which the local Cable Commission and the Human
Rights Advisory Council would preview each "Race and Reason" episode
and develop responsive counter-programming. 247 Thereafter, "Race and Rea-
son" and its accompanying counter-programming became regular fare on
public access. s
Controversial access programming is not the sole domain of white-supre-
macists. Communities and cable operators have also fretted over program-
ming by homosexuals,24 pro-gun advocates, extremist religious sects,2 animal
rights activists,25' and other titillating fare. 2 Controversial access program-
ming and the public reaction to the programs poses a major threat to the
continuation of access' extensive availability.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Controversiality: The Desirability on a Macro Level Versus the
Antipathy on a Micro Level
Controversial speech has received special first amendment protection from
the Supreme Court.253 As Justice Stevens once stated, "[a] regulation of
Pocatello, Idaho) ("All tapes offered for cablecast shall be made available for viewing at the
studio ... at least seven (7) days before their scheduled cablecast date to guarantee showing.").
In-studio viewing allows those who cannot afford cable an opportunity to watch public access
programming. Telephone interview of Randall Ammon, access coordinator, Pocatello, Idaho
(August 29, 1988) [hereinafter Ammon interview].
247. NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 18. For example, after the first cablecast of "Race
and Reason," a program produced by Bill Cosby on prejudice and a two-hour call-in show,
"Race and Reason: A Response," were shown. See Ammon, supra note 245, at 41; NIAPV
REPORT, supra note 27, at 18; Weiss, Hate Group Meets Its Match, 6 N.E.A. TODAY 6 (1988).
248. However, a later episode of "Race and Reason" claiming that AIDS was linked to
Blacks and Jews, and should be viewed as a "blessing by White Americans," created problems
in Pocatello. NIAPV REPORT, stpra note 27, at 19-22. The city council decided to postpone
the program's showing indefinitely. Later, the program's sponsor pulled the episode on the
condition that it be available for viewing in the studio for two weeks. Id. at 20-21.
249. See, e.g., R. ORINOEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 134 (problems with program
produced by gay rights group). Access programming produced by the Gay Cable Network has
been edited, censored, and sometimes cut off during the middle of the show due to the
innocuous nature of the productions. Telephone interview of Louis Maletta, president, Gay
Cable Network (August 29, 1988) (Gay Cable Network productions contain no nudity).
250. In Pocatello, Idaho, there was concern when an extremist Mormon sect sought to
cablecast an access show that might have offended the majority of the citizens in the community
who were mainline Mormons. Ammon interview, supra note 246.
251. Access production advocating animal rights caused a furor when cablecast in a college
town where the local college conducted extensive research with animals. The college president
wanted to know why he was not forewarned about the program. Telephone conversation with
Reginald Carter, National Federation of Local Cable Programmers 1October 7, 1988).
252. See, e.g., R. ORCNGEL & S. Buska, supra note 9, at 135-36 (access program satirizing
sex on television, without the use of profanity or nudity, denied time on access channel).
253. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (first amendment protects
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speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression
of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is
the purest example of a 'law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."' 254 The Court has been even more vigilant in its protection of
controversial expression in the area of mass communications. 25 The Court's
solicitude for controversial programming in the broadcast arena is evinced
by its holding in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C." 6
In Red Lion, the Court upheld the fairness doctrine which imposes a two-
prong obligation on broadcasters: 1) to provide coverage of vitally important
controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensee; and
2) to provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting
viewpoints on such issues.2 7 The first prong of the fairness doctrine imposes
an affirmative duty on broadcast licensees to air programs discussing con-
controversial parody depicting nationally known minister's first sexual encounter as occurring
in an outhouse with his mother while intoxicated); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886 (1982) (emotionally charged rhetoric of boycott organizer was protected speech even
though it did contain some references to physical violence to those who did not participate,
where the language was not followed by acts of violence); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
24 (1971) (first amendment protects the wearing of a jacket emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft").
In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), the court stated:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea.
Id. at 4. After reviewing some of the above mentioned cases, the court in Planned Parenthood
Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985) concluded: "We
question whether a regulation of speech that has as its touchstone a government official's
subjective view that the speech is 'controversial' could ever pass constitutional muster." Id. at
1230.
254. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). See id. at 544 (majority opinion) ("The Commission's
suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the
freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
255. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399 (1984) (striking
down law that prohibited noncommercial educational broadcasting station from engaging in
editorializing because "its effect is plainly to diminish rather than augment 'the volume and
quality of coverage' of controversial issues") (citations omitted); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969) (upholding broadcasting fairness doctrine because "the
'public interest' in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous debate of
controversial issues of importance and concern to the public").
256. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
257. The F.C.C. first explained the two prong obligation of the fairness doctrine in 1949.
See In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249-50 (1949). It subsequently
reaffirmed this position in In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974), aff'd
sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
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troversial issues. 28 There have been recent efforts to repeal the fairness
doctrine. The challengers assert that, in operation, the fairness doctrine
actually inhibits the presentation of controversial issues because rather than
risk accusations that they have failed to present both sides of an issue,
broadcasters avoid presenting controversial issues all together.2 9 Therefore,
if the fairness doctrine is repealed, it will be because the doctrine did not
result in enough controversial programming.
Another indication of governmental concern for the protection of contro-
versial programming is the availability of public access channels themselves.
As envisioned by both the F.C.C. and Congress, and embodied in the 1984
Cable Act, public access would allow the maximum exercise of first amend-
ment rights without regard to content.u ° Furthermore, studies indicate that
the public generally supports the right of even unpopular groups to be heard
through mass media. 61
258. The licensee must devote a "reasonable percentage" of broadcasting time to discussion
of controversial public issues- without regard to the personal views of the licensee, the possible
unpopularity of the views, or the subject matter to be discussed. In re Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249-50, 1257-58 (1949). The F.C.C. has rarely enforced the first-
prong of the fairness doctrine. See Comment, Obligation to Present Controversial Issues, supra
note 234, at 10.
The vitality of the first prong of the fairness doctrine was affirmed in a case where the
advocates of "controversial" issues wanted access to advertising time on broadcast stations.
The Court denied a general right of access to broadcast advertising time because the Court
determined that the broadcasters would present a sufficient number of programs discussing
controversial issues to fulfill their fairness doctrine obligations. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973). The Court noted that the broadcaster "is
required to 'present representative community views and voices on controversial issues which
are of importance to [its] listeners,' and it is prohibited from excluding partisan voices and
always itself 'expressing views in a bland, inoffensive manner.' " Id. (citation omitted).
259. See Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C., 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re General
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees (§ 73.1910), 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 147 (1985);
see also id. at 188 ("(Tlhe administration of the fairness doctrine has unintentionally resulted
in stifling viewpoints which may be unorthodox, unpopular or unestablished"); id. at 190 n.170
("In our view, use of the fairness doctrine to suppress any point of view, however abhorrent,
contravenes the purpose of the doctrine and raises serious constitutional implications.");
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) (extensive discussion of fairness doctrine's stifling effect); Bazelon, The First Amend-
ment and the "New Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED.
Comm. L.J. 201, 205-06 (1978) (fairness doctrine has contributed to suppressing programming
on controversial issues; rather than risk charges that they have covered only one side of an
issue).
260. See supra notes 197-230 and accompanying text.
261. Minniberg, supra note 50 (studies cited therein). The author stated:
By a two to one margin, Americans surveyed believe that in the United States,
Communists have a right to express their beliefs on television, that homosexuals
have a public right to contest laws they feel are discriminatory, and that members
of the Nazi party have a right to publish their views.
Id. at 593 (footnotes omitted).
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Despite this desire for controversiality on the macro level, these viewpoints
are usually met with hostility on the micro level.2 2 In the context of public
access programming, three groups-local governments, cable companies, and
cable subscribers-are averse to controversial programming, each for differ-
ent reasons.
Although it was the lobbying arm of the local governments that won the
battle for access under the 1984 Cable Act 2 63 often local government is
access' enemy. Many local officials fear performing under the scrutiny of
critical access programs which the official cannot control.2" In fact, the
primary focus of many access programs may be to criticize and critique local
elected officials.2 65 The politicians thus bothered may seek the earliest op-
portunity to rid themselves of the discomfort caused by the programs by
eliminating or restricting the use of access channels. 2" In a recent case, a
jury found that local government officials were motivated to secure public
access channels by a desire to obtain political support and aid their political
supporters. 267 The local government can exercise such power through its
control over the access channels' budget (the source of which is usually
franchise fee payments made by the cable company to the local government),
its power to select favorable access management board members who typically
operate the access channels, and its power to modify the franchise require-
ments.268
262. This phenomenon might be coined the NIMBY ("Not in my back yard") doctrine. A
NIMBY believes that some things which are generally desirable-e.g., more prisons, drug
rehabilitation homes, or a convenient 24-hour drive-through Burger King-can only be imple-
mented if they are not in his back yard. For public access purposes, a NIMBY might posit, "I
agree that controversial groups should be allowed to say what they want-just as long as I
don't have to be exposed to it."
263. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
264. R. ORINGEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 132.
265. Ronka, supra note 52, at 9.
266. Id.
Should access channels become a source of popular or effective political criticism
and debate some local officials who are stung by the reality of uninhibited, robust
and wide-open exposure may feel little incentive to protect the extended life of
public access channels and may, instead, welcome an early opportunity to abandon
them.
Id. at 12. See also R. ORINOEL & S. Busica, supra note 9, at 133 (danger of local governments,
offended by political message or criticism, discriminating when allocating access resource).
267. Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1338 (E.D. Cal.
1987).
268. For an example of a typical scenario where a local government exerts its budgetary
control over controversial programming:
In another example in what we will call city X, local government officials took
umbrage at a series of programs produced by a local gay rights group. The first
inquiry focused on why such a program was permitted on the access channel in the
first place. The response from city X's access management corporation described
the democratic, first-come, first-served principles of the access system. Next, the
city administration officials wondered aloud whether the nonprofit organization
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Another reason local government may oppose controversial programming
on public access is fear that it may be seen as endorsing the views espoused
on the programs. Government officials believe that their constituents might
hold them responsible for the controversial programming because it was the
officials who initially required the cable operator to provide public access
channels.26 9 Therefore, the logic follows, if the local government disagreed
with the content of certain access programming, the officials would exercise
their power to eliminate it. While the citizenry may hold the officials
politically responsible for the programs' content, 2 0 given the access channels
likely status as a public forum, 27' it is unlikely that allowing such program-
ming on access channels constitutes "state action" which would subject the
government to constitutional liability. 27 2
Another group which traditionally opposes the public access concept is
the cable operator. Cable operators have a natural disinclination toward
public access-regardless of the content-because access requirements cost
them money. 273 If there were no public access, cable operators would not
should change its nondiscriminatory policy so that "unsavory" groups could be
excluded. The access management of course explained the First Amendment impli-
cations of that type of censorship .... Not long after, the government officials of
city X began to wonder publicly whether city X's access management organization
should continue to receive its present level of funding from the city from the cable
franchise fees. Finally, the city X government called for an evaluation of the access
organization that was directly related to its funding.
R. OR. OEL & S. Busic., supra note 9, at 134.
For a real-life example of such tactics, see NIAPV REPoRT, supra note 27, at I I (after white-
supremacist programming aired in Cincinnati, Ohio, a member of the access management board
stated, "If the present board and/or the Cincinnati Cable Office will not take action against
[the cable operator] for displaying [the controversial messages], why should the councilmen of
Cincinnati continue to fund the Cincinnati Cable Office?") (citation omitted).
269. This argument was made in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981), and National
Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016-18 (4th Cir. 1973).
270. This is the same risk that politicians face whenever they create a new forum for
expression. Cf. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw &
EcoN. 15, 16 (1967) ("[Wle all take as commonplace a degree of government surveillance for
broadcasting which would by instant reflex ignite the fiercest protest were it found in other
areas of communication").
271. See infra notes 303-31 and accompanying text.
272. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("[Aln open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices ... [and] such a policy 'would
no more commit the University ... to religious goals' than it is 'now committed to the goals
of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group
eligible to use its facilities.") (citations omitted). See also Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Realm
of La. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 578 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1978) (occasional
and temporary use of state facilities by discriminatory groups along with all others does not
necessarily constitute state involvement in activities); Ringers, 473 F.2d at 1016-18 (state not
considered to espouse views expressed in public forum).
273. See R. ORINOEL & S. Busicu, supra note 9, at 132 (cable industry wants control of
access channels for commercial reasons); LaPierre, supra note 144, at 103-04 (full public access
is contrary to cable operator's economic interest and administrative convenience).
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have to provide equipment and personnel to fulfill their current access
requirements. Additionally, the number of access channels diminishes the
number of channels the cable operator would otherwise provide to paying
professional programming vendors. Public access programming may also
cost the cable operator advertising revenues from its local origination chan-
nels. Due to their similar local orientation, public access programming may
steal many origination viewers, thereby diminishing the operators' advertising
subscriber base.27 4
Although some cable operators may be able to rationalize these costs as
consideration for the "good will" the channels generate, 2" this justification
disappears when the public access channel cablecasts controversial program-
ming.27 6 Cable operators fear that the presentation of controversial program-
ming on access channels will cost them subscribers. In fact, the cable
operators in Spokane, Washington, and Jackson, Mississippi, have urged
the elimination of public access channels in order to avoid unpopular con-
troversial racist programming, which they believed cut into their subscriber
bases.77
Another reason cable operators resist the cablecasting of controversial
programming is because they are afraid the community will blame them for
the fact the views are aired.2 8 The cable operator may also fear being seen
as endorsing such controversial views.279 However, like the associational
argument made on behalf of local governments,n0 such an argument is
274. The divergence of this channel displacement argument and the cable operator's first
amendment argument occurred in Quincy Cable TV v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In Quincy Cable TV, the court struck down the F.C.C.'s "must-carry" rules which required
cable operators to carry "every local or significantly viewed signal irrespective of the number
of must-carry channels already being transmitted, the degree of duplication, or the channel
capacity of a cable system. Id. at 1440. The court concluded that the must-carry rule violated
the first amendment because it infringed on the editorial discretion of the cable operator. Id.
at 1453-54.
275. See supra note 164.
276. NIAPV REFPoRT, supra note 27, at 27. "Cable companies provide public access primarily
because they are required to as part of their franchise: It costs the companies money, and they
generally fear that controversial programming will cost them subscribers." Id.
277. See NIAPV UPDATE, supra note 235, at 6.
278. Price, supra note 48, at 550 n.55. "[B]ecause of the impact of television, we have a
hidden desire to place some responsible party in control as assurance that the medium is not
put in the service of persons or groups with attitudes and mores too distant from the mainstream
of American thought." Id. For studies suggesting the power of the television medium, see supra
notes 234-35.
279. See Nadel, supra note 44, at 68 (cable industry might argue that dissemination of
offensive programming on access could cause irreparable harm to cable operator's reputation).
According to the chairman of American TV and Communication Corporation: "[Mlany cable
systems are vigorously attacked for programming that appears on the access channels. A prime
example is our Manhattan cable system.... [A] number of sex-oriented programs are distributed
over the access channels. We have been criticized by local, state, and federal officials, as well
as subscribers for carrying these programs." Id.
280. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with the public forum nature of public access channelsY'
Finally, the cable operator will disfavor any access programming that the
local government opposes because the operator is beholden to the city for
its lifeblood-the exclusive franchise. When the operator's franchise comes
up for renewal, local officials may not look favorably upon a cable operator
if an inordinate amount of critical programming appeared on its access
channels, or if the cablecasting of controversial programming resulted in
angry voters, despite the fact that the operator is not supposed to exercise
control over the content of access.2 92
Finally, cable subscribers and the citizenry of the community often oppose
the cablecasting of controversial programming. They oppose controversial
access programming because their monthly cable subscription fees and/or
tax dollars are being used to furnish access studio equipment and facilities
281. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (given large number of groups
meeting on campus, it would be unlikely for students to infer University support from the mere
fact of a campus meeting place); National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d
1010, 1018 (4th Cir. 1973) ("We are confident that if the high school auditorium is made
available to all groups, the very diversity and complexity of the views expressed, taken in bulk,
will cure any incidental official identification attendant upon the use of the building for the
articulation of extreme or abusive speech.").
This associational argument also falls if one believes that public access channels are common
carriers. Nadel, supra note 44, at 68. Professor Nadel argues:
RCA could make a similar argument that its NBC network or the sale of its TVs
could be seriously damaged if television received a bad reputation due to the
performance of some disreputable broadcaster. A similar argument was unsuccess-
fully made by AT&T when it sought to retain full control over the marketing of
terminal equipment in the telephone industry.
Id.
Another reason the Widmar Court dismissed the associational argument is because the
University's student handbook provided that "the University's name will not be identified in
any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its
members." 454 U.S. at 274 n.14. Most local public access regulations have a similar provision.
See, e.g., Cable Access-St. Paul, Inc.: Rules and Regulations, Art. IX(H)(13) (St. Paul,
Minnesota, Apr. 8, 1986) ("An announcement will be cablecast before the Access User's
program material: You are viewing community access programming made available through the
facilities of Cable Access-St. Paul, Inc. Program content is the responsibility of the program
producer and/or sponsor."); Warner Cable of Cincinnati: Access Rules and Operating Proce-
dures 2 (Cincinnati, Ohio, Mar. 31, 1988) ("An access user may identify themselves [sic] as a
'community producer' but not as a representative of Warner Cable of [sic] its affiliates in any
manner.").
282. Ronka, supra note 52, at 9 (cable system may reflect government's or incumbent's point
of view where owner perceives it is subject to government influence over programming). Cf.
F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). There, the Court stated:
The court jester who mocks the King must chobse his words with great care. An
artist is likely to paint a flattering portrait of his patron. The child who wants a
new toy does not preface his request with a comment on how fat his mother is.
Newspaper publishers have been known to listen to their advertising managers.
Elected officials may remember how their elections were financed.
Id. at 408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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for the cable casting of views they do not support.2 3 However, this monetary
support is indistinguishable from the tax dollars that go to maintain streets,
sidewalks, parks, and other places where controversial views may be aired.
While the cable subscribers and local citizens may not agree with the views,
courts have generally not been amenable to such objections when the mode
of communication supported by the money is a public forum.2 4 The amount
of control that any one of these groups may exert over access programming
turns on whether cable access is considered a public forum.
B. Public Access as Public Forum
Government limitations on access to a public place or to a means of
communication are subject to scrutiny under first amendment "public fo-
rum" analysis. The permissible scope of such restrictions differs depending
on the character of the property. 85 The Supreme Court has recognized three
types of public forums: the traditional public forum; the public forum created
by government designation (limited public forum); and the nonpublic for-
uM. 2" However, to date, no court has determined how public access channels
should be treated under first amendment "public forum" analysis.2s7 How
283. See D. LEDuc, supra note 6, at 156 (noting that when government subsidizes a means
of expression through tax dollars, problem arises when taxpayers disagree over view espoused).
284. See generally League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 384 n.16 (certain number
of taxpayers will always object to way public money is spent); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265
(University facilities designated limited public forum supported by $41 per semester activity
fee); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91-92 (1976) (in upholding election financing through
amounts designated by individual taxpayers on their tax forms, Court noted that every appro-
priation applies public money in manner to which some taxpayers object); Ringers, 473 F.2d
at 1014 ("This partial dedication as a forum ... makes the school auditorium conceptually
indistinguishable for first amendment purposes as a 'public place' from streets and parks, which
too, are acquired and maintained at public expense.") (emphasis added); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 577 (1980) ("In some limited circumstances, then, government
and its taxpayers are required to support speech (by providing property of economic value for
it) independent of how controversial or disagreeable the speech may be.").
285. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). See also
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2499 (1988) ("To ascertain what limits, if any, may be
placed on protected speech, we have often focused on the 'place' of that speech, considering
the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ."); Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n,
863 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1989). In Estiverne, the court opined:
Although public forum analysis arose in the context of disputes over access to
places under the control of the government, the analysis also applies to other
'instrumentalities' of communication that are under government control.... Thus,
the forum need not be defined in geographic terms. It may be defined instead as
the particular 'means of communication' to which the speaker seeks access.
Id. at 376.
286. See Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2499; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
287. Van Eaton & Earley, supra note 218, at 8. Some courts have abstractly considered the
public forum implications of public access channels. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973) (in striking down a general right of access to
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much control a government entity or state actor may exert with regard to
access is a function of how such channels are characterized under this
analysis.
A traditional public forum is a place which, through tradition or govern-
ment fiat has been devoted to expression' and the "free exchange of
ideas. '2 9 Public streets, sidewalks and parks epitomize the traditional public
forum.290 Content-based exclusions from the traditional public forum must
be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." 29' Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions
advertising time on broadcast stations, Court noted that access to cable television is available
on public access channels under the 1972 F.C.C. cable regulations); Estiverne, 863 F.2d at 380
n.12 (court suggests public access channels may be public forum); Muir v. Alabama Educ.
Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (Rubin, J., concurring) (suggests that
some channels on cable television may be a public forum); Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra
note 166, at 585 (implies that public access channels are traditional public forum because
channels are modern version of city street); Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 51 (public
access channels are a "governmentally created public forum"); Van Eaton & Earley, supra note
218, at 10 ("[T]here are good reasons to suppose that access channels will be treated as property
which has been devoted to debate.").
288. Perry Educ. Assn, 460 U.S. at 45.
289. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
290. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2500 ("No
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets
are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora."); Boos v.
Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162 (1988) (same); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute
restricting expression on sidewalks surrounding Supreme Court building held unconstitutional);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (streets and parks immemorially held in trust for the
use of the public); Grutzmacher v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 700 F. Supp. 1497 (N.D.
11. 1988) (Chicago's Daley Center Plaza-"a wide and deep park like area artfully appointed
with a large Picasso expression in steel, an eternal flame, a large rectangular shallow pool
crisscrossed with pipes of fountain sprays and several foliage areas with concrete benches about
them ... [a] wide open space call [sic] the Daley Center is flat and decoratively paved with
squares of special sidewalk cement"-a traditional public forum).
There are reasons to believe that expression on sidewalks and in parks may receive more
protection than that on streets since expression on the street competes with motorized vehicular
traffic. See ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986). In ACORN the court
noted that there existed:
[s]ubstantial differences in nature between a street, kept open to motorized vehicle
traffic, and a sidewalk or public park. A pedestrian ordinarily has an entitlement
to be present upon the sidewalk or on the grounds of a park and thus is generally
free at all times to engage in expression and public discourse at such locations. This
is obviously not true of streets continually filled with pulsing vehicle traffic.
Id. at 1267.
291. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. See, e.g., Boos,
108 S. Ct. at 1161-68 (striking down as content-based a law which prohibited the "display of
any flag, banner, placard, or device designed or adapted to intimidate, coerce, or bring into
public odium any foreign government ... or to bring into public disrepute political, social, or
economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government ... within 500 feet" of any
building-including public streets and sidewalks-occupied by a foreign government).
The Supreme Court extensively discussed its aversion to content-based regulations in the
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are permissible if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion."292
A limited public forum consists of property which the state has opened for
public use as a place for expressive activity, even though the state was not
required to create such a forum.293 The government can limit the use of a
public forum2  to a certain class of speakers, 291 to the discussion of certain
topics,"6 or to a limited amount of time.2 As long as the government retains
context of traditional public fora in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). In striking down an ordinance that forbade peaceful nonlabor picketing, the Court
stated that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its idea, its subject matter, or its content."Id. at 95.
The Court concluded that:
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they
intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.
rd. at 96.
292. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Frisby, 108 S. Ct. at 2495 (upholding
content-neutral ordinance prohibiting all picketing "focused" solely on one home located on a
residential street to advance significant governmental interest of protecting residential privacy);
Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1168-69 (upholding law which made it unlawful to congregate within 500
feet of an embassy and refuse to disperse after having been ordered to do so after the police
reasonably believed the congregation presented a threat to security or peace); Heffron v.
International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding rule that prohib-
ited sale of any merchandise outside of fixed locations at state fair); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding anti-noise ordinance designed to prevent disruption
of nearby school although noise concedediy emanated from protest on nearby sidewalk);
ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding statute that prohibited
solicitation of contributions from passengers in vehicles at intersections of public streets).
In declaring Chicago's Daley Center Plaza a traditional public forum, the court described
conceivably permissible time, place and manner restrictions:
This requires management, and management naturally involves simple matters of
time, place and manner, deadlines for application, communication regarding per-
mits, preconditions for uses and the sharing of uses, matters about the size, the
erection and removal of structures, the assumption of costs for utilities, and the
protection of the plaza against the costs that could grow out of injuries to third
parties caused by the uses of themselves.
Grulzmacher, 700 F. Supp. at 1503.
293. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
294. As one court pointed out, the term limited public forum may be misleading: "Although
the government, when it turns property from a nonpublic forum into a public one, may do so
only for a limited purpose .... it also may open the forum to the same extent as a traditional
forum." M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 791 F.2d 1466, 1472
n.2 (1986).
295. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university facilities available
to registered student groups). Cf. Planned Parenthood Assoc./Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (advertising space on car cards on the interiors of
city buses and transit trains created a limited public forum for those willing to pay fee).
296. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (limited speech at open school board meeting of school matters,
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the "open" character of the limited public forum, the government must regulate
the forum according to the same standards which apply to a traditional public
forum.2 Furthermore, depending on the nature of the limitation placed on
the property, the government is required to extend access "to other entities of
similar character."'' The most problematic aspect of the limited public forum
is determining the appropriate "limits" of the forum so as to assure that any
restrictions imposed are not a disguise for censorship.'
A nonpublic forum consists of property which is not by tradition or
government designation a forum for public communication.' 0' Permissable
including teacher's union collective-bargaining negotiations); Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm.
of City of Boston, 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973) (allowing individuals to use inter-school mail
to transmit information opposing school integration through bussing); Toward A Gayer Bicen-
tennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632 (D.R.I. 1976) (limited
access to Old State House to those groups or individuals whose projects or themes were related
to Rhode Island bicentennial).
297. See generally Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (state not required to retain open character of
facility indefinitely); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (same).
298. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
299. Id. at 48. See Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986) ("When the
government ... creates a limited public forum for the use of certain speakers or for the
discussion of certain subjects, the first amendment protections provided to traditional public
forums only apply to entities of a character similar to those the government admits to the
forum.")
300. Toward A Gayer Bicentennial Comm., 417 F. Supp. at 640 n.9 (limits must be drawn
"so that they could be applied even-handedly, and not used as a shield to cover censorship").
See also Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 575 (9th Cir. 1984) (court required
to review with particular scrutiny any claim that governmental body is attempting to suppress
controversial or political expression).
One commentator has suggested that the limited public forum category is dead. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1713, 1745-57 (1987). Professor Post asserts that Perry Educ. Ass'n:
[i]mposes no first amendment constraints whatever on the government's ability to
build discriminatory criteria into the very definition or purpose of the limited public
forum, and thus as a practical matter the government remains as free to limit public
access to a limited public forum as to a nonpublic forum.
Id. at 1753. Post concludes that Cornelius "shrinks the limited public forum to such insignif-
icance that is difficult to imagine how a plaintiff could ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to
gain access to such a forum." Id. at 1756-57.
301. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. For further examples of nonpublic forums, see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (high school newspaper); Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 788 (Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive aimed at federal employees);
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (military base); United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Assoc., 453 U.S. 113 (1981) (mail boxes); Estiverne v. Louisiana
State Bar Assoc., 863 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Louisiana Bar Journal," a monthly publication
of the local bar association); M.N.C. of Hinesville, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Defense,
791 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1986) (preferential access points for distribution of publications on a
military base); Calash, 788 F.2d 80 (municipal stadium); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television
Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (state operated public television stations). Cf. Advocates
for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976) (state official allowed discretion in allocating
National Endowment for the Arts grants-in-aid for literary magazines); The Network Project
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government restriction on this type of forum are much more extensive than
those permitted with respect to public or limited public forums. The gov-
ernment may reserve the nonpublic forum for "its intended purposes, com-
municative or otherwise," and can regulate the property with regard to
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint
neutral." 02
1. Public Forum Analysis Applied to Public Access Channels
To receive treatment as a traditional public forum a place or method of
communication must possess the same attributes as forums historically as-
sociated with the free and open expression of ideas. 303 Unfortunately, most
of the cases applying this test only consider those fora already declared
traditional public fora, i.e., streets, sidewalks, and parks. For a variety of
reasons, public access channels do not possess all the attributes of other
traditional public fora. A far from comprehensive list of distinguishing
factors between public access channels and other traditional public fora
includes: I) cable systems are not required to have public access channels
(and many do not) whereas most every community has streets, sidewalks or
parks; 2) to get a program on public access, the citizen must be able to use
video equipment (and usually go through a training program) whereas the
speaker using a street, sidewalk, or park to express himself needs no spe-
cialized training; 3) there is usually a delay in time between when the public
access program is produced and when the program is cablecast (unless the
program is a "live" production) whereas expression in a street, sidewalk or
park is immediately communicated; 4) public access channels are not widely
utilized whereas "[s]treets and parks are part of the experience of all citi-
zens";3 4 and 5) the public access channels are a creature of statutes-from
the F.C.C. to the 1984 Cable Act-whereas access to streets, parks and
sidewalks can not be statutorily abolished.10'
To determine whether a "place" is a limited public forum or nonpublic
forum, courts look primarily to the government's intent in allowing access
to the property.3 6 A "place" is a limited public forum only if the government
v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399 (D.D.C. 1979) (Corporation
for Public Broadcasting allowed discretion in allocating resources for development of public
television programming).
302. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
303. Hazelwood School Dist., 108 S. Ct. at 567-68 (public forum must possess all of the
attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums).
304. See Post, supra note 300, at 1793 (describing attributes of traditional public forum).
305. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (government cannot statutorily
transform traditional public forum into nonpublic forum).
306. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (government creates public forum not by inadvertance,
but by intentionally opening nontraditional public forum for public use); Calash, 788 F.2d at
83 (court should look to government's intent in establishing a forum). The Court will closely
scrutinize any allegations of intent. See, e.g., Hazelwood School District, 108 S. Ct. at 568-69
(Court dismissed arguable recitations of open nature of school newspaper).
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has made a policy or practice of opening it to use by the general public or
some segment thereof.3°0 Courts will also scrutinize the nature of the property
and its compatibility with expressive activity in order to discern the govern-
ment's intent.es Therefore, an examination of the government's policies and
practices relating to public access channels and the channels' compatibility
with indiscriminate expression is necessary.3°9
a. The government's public access "practice"
When analyzing the government's practice, courts examine the previous
use of the forum or how the forum is customarily operated to determine
whether the government intended indiscriminate access to the forum.310
During the period in which public access channels were under the aegis of
the F.C.C., it required the cable operator to promulgate access rules man-
dating that access be provided on a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory
basis.3 ' Under the 1984 Cable Act, franchising authorities are responsible
for promulgating access rules and regulations-virtually all of which include
a first-come, first served provision. 12 This practice of first-come, first-served
use of public access channels is consistent with the notion of indiscriminate
use by the general public and this practice would therefore constitute evidence
of a limited public forum.
b. The government's public access "policy"
The courts will also examine the policy the government articulates for a
forum to gauge the government's intent. The governing policy statement for
public access channels is the 1984 Cable Act. In describing public access
channels as the "video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic
parallel to the printed leaflet," 313 the legislators arguably intended access to
307. Hazelwood School District, 108 S. Ct. at 568.
308. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. See also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)
(issue is whether manner of expression is incompatible with normal activity of particular forum
at particular time).
309. Another formulation of the limited public forum test asks: "does the character of the
place, the pattern of usual activity, the nature of its essential purpose and the population who
take advantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place for communi-
cation of views on issues of political and social significance." Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. City of
West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972)). The foregoing analysis subsumes the
elements of this test as well.
310. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03. See also Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d
560, 576 (9th Cir. 1984) (nature of previous use of forum may also be relevant).
311. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Pocatello-Vision 12 Programming Policy at 1 IPocatello, Idaho, Oct. 1,
1987); Sangamon State University/Times Mirror Cable Television Qf Springfield, Inc.: Access
Rules § 3(a) (Springfield, Illinois, undated); Comcast Cablevision of Indianapolis, Inc. Public
Access Policies and Procedures at 1 (Indianapolis, Indiana, Sept. 1, 1988); ACCESS-Dayton
Operating Rules and Regulations § 1.3 (Dayton, Ohio, Apr. 1986).
313. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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these channels to be indiscriminately available to the general public.
The 1984 Cable Act's implicit prohibition against the exercise of editorial
control over public access programming by the franchising authority or any
other governmental agency also suggests Congress intended access to be
unlimited.3 1 4 The 1984 Cable Act's sponsor in the House stated that public
access would provide a diversity of viewpoints only if the channels were
available without rules or regulations concerning cable program content."'
The House Report stated, "(tlhe access channel requirements ... will ensure
a diversity of information sources without government intrusion into the
content of programming carried on the cable system. 3 1 6 Additionally, section
544(0(1) of the 1984 Cable Act preempts all levels of government from
exercising content control over public access programming except as expressly
set out in the Act.3"7 Therefore, the local franchising authority cannot exercise
editorial control over public access programming because such control is not
expressly provided for in the 1984 Cable Act. The government can only
exercise control over programming on the governmental access channels2 8
and perhaps also on the educational access channels,2 9 but not on the
channels designated for public access.3 0
Furthermore, this implicit prohibition against governmental editorial con-
trol over public access programming is evinced by the 1984 Cable Act's
provisions relating to cable systems owned by governmental entities. Congress
was so concerned with governmental censorship that, if a governmental
entity owned and operated a cable system, the 1984 Cable Act prohibited
the franchising authority from exercising any editorial control over the
content of any cable service.3 2 ' In such a system, the franchising authority
314. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 587. See also Preferred Brief, supra note
94, at 18 ("government is prohibited from favoring one speaker, viewpoint or subject over
another" on public access channels); R. OmuNGEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 131.
315. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 42, at 292 (statement of Rep. Wirth).
316. H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 30, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4672 (emphasis added).
317. 1984 CABLE ACT § 544(f)(1) provides in relevant part: "[a]ny Federal agency, State, or
franchising authority may not impose requirements regarding the provision of content of cable
services, except as expressly provided in this subchapter." See generally Jones v. Wilkinson,
800 F.2d 989, 995 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring) (local franchising authorities are
preempted from exercising control over programming on access channels); Meyerson, Coaxial
Wires, supra note 166, at 587.
318. See H.R. REP. 934, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4684 (no limitation
on franchising authority's or other governmental entity's editorial control over application of
channel capacity to governmental purposes).
319. See 1984 CABLE ACT § 522(2) (in cable system owned by governmental entity, government
prohibited from exercising editorial control over cable content, except for governmental and
educational access channels).
320. See Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 602; Meyerson, Rights, supra note
146, at 51.
321. 1984 CABLE ACT § 533(e)(2). See also S. REP. 67, supra note 7, at 21 (if governmental
entity acquires ownership interest in cable system, it is prohibited from controlling content of
any programming unless program is generated on governmental access channels).
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would have to delegate the responsibility of content control (i.e., selecting
programming services) to a separate entity.3 " Therefore, based on the "pol-
icy" enunciated by the 1984 Cable Act, Congress intended that public access
channels be available for indiscriminate use.
c. Public access' compatibility with indiscriminate expression
Under the "compatibility" element, the Court will scrutinize the nature
of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity in order to
discern the government's intent.13 ' The compatibility of media and expression
is obvious. Media, like broadcasting, are specifically dedicated to commu-
nication; transmitting expression is the media's exclusive purpose. The com-
patibility analysis is equally applicable to public access channels. When
considering "compatibility," courts examine whether the government takes
an active or passive role in its relation to the forum.31 Because public access
322. 1984 CABLE ACT § 533(e)(2).
323. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Justice Brennan commented on the subject of the compatibility
of broadcasting and expression:
[Unlike the streets, parks, public libraries, and other "forums" that we have held
to be appropriate for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the broadcast media
are dedicated specifically to communication .... [T]he expression of ideas-whether
political, commercial, musical, or otherwise-is the exclusive purpose of the broad-
cast spectrum.
Id. at 194-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
324. Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 317, 380 (5th Cir. 1989). "Where a
forum serves as an essentially passive vehicle for expressive activity by the public, or by a
particular class of speakers, unrestricted access is not incompatible with the facility's primary
activity." Id. (quoting Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n. 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (Sth
Cir. 1982)). "[T]here is a constitutionally significant difference between the government's role
in speaking through a state-sponsored medium and its role in managing a public resource that
serves as an essentially passive vehicle for the expressive activities of others." Id. at 379. This
theory is consistent with Professor Post's position that, in lieu of a public forum analysis which
focuses on the characteristics of the "place," courts should focus on whether the government
takes a position of "governance" or "management" of the "place." Post, supra note 300, at
1775. According to Professor Post:
In situations of governance the state is bound by the ordinary principles of first
amendment jurisprudence, but when exercising managerial authority ordinary first
amendment rights are subordinate to the instrumental logic characteristic of organ-
izations, and the state can in large measure control speech on the basis of an
organization's need to achieve its institutional ends. This instrumental logic even
extends so far as to justify courts deferring to the judgment of institutional officials
respecting the need to control speech, if such deference is itself thought necessary
for the attainment of institutional ends.
Id.
For example, the government "governs" the streets, sidewalks and parks, but "manages" a
prison or military base. Under Post's analysis, expression on public access channels would
receive complete first amendment protection because the local government "governs" the
channels. The local government cannot "manage" the programming on public access because
it is prohibited from exercising editorial control. See supra notes 314-21 and accompanying
text.
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is controlled by the access programmers and not the franchising authority,
the government's passive role suggests the channels' compatibility with in-
discriminate use. 312 Finally, the Court seems less likely to find expression
compatible with a place if such a holding would impinge on the government's
role as an employer. 26 However, uninhibited expression on public access
channels would not interfere with the government's employerly duties over
its personnel.
The analysis of all three factors as they relate to public access channels
demonstrates that the channels are open for indiscriminate use by the general
public. The government's public access policy has always been first-come,
first-served. The governing policy of public access channels, the 1984 Cable
Act, demands uninhibited utilization of public access to fulfill its intended
first amendment goals. Furthermore, the 1984 Cable Act, by prohibiting all
levels of government from exercising editorial control over the public access
programming, indicates the indiscriminate availablity use of public access
channels. Finally, public access channels are compatible with indiscriminate
expression by the general public. Such use neither interferes with the gov-
ernment's active control over a forum nor infringes on the government's
power over its personnel as an employer.
325. Public access channels are distinguishable from cases finding as non-public fora a state-
run bar association magazine, Estiverne, 863 F.2d 371; state-owned public television stations,
Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1023 (1983); government funding for literary magazines, Advocates for Arts v. Thomson,
532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); and government funded public
television stations, The Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2399 (D.D.C. 1979). In each of these cases involving an arguably similar mode of
communication to public access channels, the court realized that the government was working
with a limited resource and necessarily had to make inherently subjective decisions. See Estiverne,
863 F.2d at 381 ("In order to fulfill the Bar Journal's purposes as a trade journal, its editors
must have some degree of discretion analogous to that exercised by editors of private trade
journals-with respect to both articles and advertisements."); Muir, 688 F.2d at 1044 (govern-
ment must make subjective determination as to whether programming is responsive to needs,
problems and interests of residents of area it serves); Advocates for Arts, 532 F.2d at 796
(allocation of space without consideration of expressive content of competing applicants'
productions is inconceivable; purpose of such a program is to promote art and requires exercise
of judgment); The Network Project, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2409 (government must apportion
finite resource-money; decisions will necessarily involve consideration of content). In all four
cases, the courts permitted the government to exercise an active role in managing the alleged
forum. This is not the case with public access channels. Congress, through the 1984 Cable Act,
did not allow the franchising authority to exercise editorial control over access programming.
See supra note 314-21 and accompanying text.
326. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805-06 (citations omitted) (federal workplace, like any place of
employment, must have wide discretion over management of internal affairs in order to
accomplish business objectives). This level of "discretion and control" is analogous to the
editorial discretion allowed in certain governmentally controlled forums. See supra note 325.
For example, in Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788, the alleged forum was an internal mailer for
contributions by federal employees, and in Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, it was a school
district's internal mail system.
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d. The "limits" to public access channels as limited public fora
Public access channels are "limited" as to certain speakers and as to
certain topics. The only limitation consistently placed on the identity of the
access user by franchising authorities requires that the program be the
"product" of a community citizen. Some access regulations require that only
citizens living within the cable franchise be allowed to cablecast public access
programs,3 27 others merely give a local citizen's program scheduling prior-
ity,328 and some permit programming produced outside the community if a
local citizen sponsors the program.3 29
327. See ACCESS-Dayton: Operating Rules and Regulations § 1.1 (Dayton, Ohio, Apr.
1986) (public access users defined as "any individual or group or organization" in the franchise
service area). The Sacramento Cable Foundation adopted the following residency definition:
3.2 Residency.
Any resident of Sacramento County or an employee or agent of a non-profit
community group or organization with offices located within Sacramento County
will satisfy the residency requirement.
3.21 Residency shall be defined as having a verifiable Sacramento County residential
mailing address.
3.22 Staff members or representatives of a non-profit community group or organ-
ization with offices located within Sacramento County shall be considered as
satisfying the residency requirement.
3.23 Full-time student status at an educational institution located in Sacramento
County will satisfy the residency requirement.
Sacramento Community Cable Foundation § 3.2-3.23 (Sacramento, California, undated) But
cf. In re RVS Cablevision Corp., 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1133 (F.C.C. 1976) (striking down
franchise requirement that gives a preference to city residents, businesses, industries and
educational and cultural institutions in the use of leased access as inconsistent with first-come,
first-served mandate of F.C.C. regulations).
328. See Sacramento Community Cable Foundation § 13.11(a) (Sacramento, California,
undated) (locally produced programming receives highest scheduling priority); Pocatello- Vision
12 Programming Policy (Pocatello, Idaho, Oct. 1, 1987) ("When time limitations require that
choices be made between offered programming, first priority shall be given to locally produced
public ... access programming .... Non-locally produced programming shall be used to
supplement this schedule, as channel time and staff time permit."); Sangamon State Universityl
Times Mirror Cable Television of Springfield, Inc. Access Rules § 3(b) (Springfield, Illinois,
undated) ("When scheduling conflicts arise, SSU shall give preference to ... access channel
users living or located within the ... franchise area.").
329. See Pocatello- Vision 12 Programming Policy (Pocatello, Idaho, Oct. 1, 1987) ("(Nion-
locally produced programming will be cablecast only if it is part of an exchange with other
access centers, or if it is sponsored by an individual or organization within the community.");
Allen County Television Center: Operating Rules and Regulations § 5(E) (Fort Wayne, Indiana,
Jan. 1, 1988) ("Requests to cablecast programming produced outside Allen County must be
submitted by a county resident."); Cable Access-St. Paul, Inc. Rules and Regulations Art.
IX(G)(2) (St. Paul, Minnesota, June 9, 1986) ("Programming not produced through Cable
Access-St. Paul, Inc., facilities must be submitted by a resident of St. Paul, an official St.
Paul Community representative, or a member of Cable Access-St. Paul, Inc."); Warner Cable
of Cincinnati: Access Rules and Operating Procedures 1 (Cincinnati, Ohio, Mar. 31, 1988)
("Non-residents of Cincinnati may produce programs if they are sponsored by a Cincinnati
resident or group and may take Warner Cable access workshops and use access equipment.")
(emphasis added).
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Public access is also "limited" as to permissible topics. Since its genesis,
public access programming has always been noncommercial. When the F.C.C.
required public access channels, it directed the cable operator to promulgate
rules describing the noncommercial nature of the channels.30 The F.C.C.
also established commercial access requirements to provide an outlet for
commercial speech and promulgated regulations which provide for leased
access. Similarly, the 1984 Cable Act has provisions for leased access. The
availability of leased access channels implicitly suggests that public access
channels are to retain their noncommercial nature. Furthermore, most fran-
chising authority access regulations prohibit commercial programming on
their public access channels."'
The availability of public access channels is thus limited to certain speakers
and topics. Therefore, the channels constitute a limited public forum for the
cablecasting of locally-supplied, noncommercial programming.
2. State Action
Intermingled with the public forum question is a concomitant "state
action" problem. In any system with public access, some organization must
perform duties such as ensuring playback of programs on the channel,
managing public access studios and facilities, and training interested citizens
to use access facilities.3 2 This "access manager" is usually responsible for
enforcing the access rules and procedures promulgated by the franchising
authority under the 1984 Cable Act. Determining the legality of any editorial
control the access manager exercises over offensive or controversial access
programming depends on the characteristics of the entity.333 Access managers
fall into three main categories: 1) the cable operator;33 4 2) an arm of the
330. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Pocatello- Vision 12 Programming Policy (Pocatello, Idaho, Oct. 1, 1987)
(requiring that programming be non-commercial); Sacramento Community Cable Foundation
§ 6.1-6.2 (Sacramento, California, undated) (prohibits (a) "[mlaterial designed to promote the
sale of commercial products or services" and (b) "[c]ommercial programming which in whole
or in part depicts, demonstrates, or discusses products, services, or businesses with the intent
or substantial effect of benefitting or enhancing a profit-making enterprise."); Sangamon State
University/Times Mirror Cable Television of Springfield, Inc.-Access Rules § 2(a) (Springfield,
Illinois, undated) (public access is use of a cable television channel for non-commercial pro-
gramming); Allen County Television Center: Operating Rules and Regulations § 2(C) (Fort
Wayne, Indiana, Jan. 1, 1988) (advertising for sale of commercial products or services, including
spots produced by or on behalf of a candidate for public office, is prohibited); Comcast
Cablevision of Indianapolis, Inc.-Public Access Policies and Procedures (Indianapolis, Indiana,
Sept. 1, 1988) (advertising material promoting sale of products or services is prohibited); Warner
Cable of Cincinnati: Access Rules and Operating Procedures 2 (Cincinnati, Ohio, Mar. 31,
1988) (forbids advertising which promotes the sale of products, services, trade, business or
person).
332. Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 52-53.
333. Id. at 53.
334. "The primary disadvantage of having an access center operated by a cable operator is
that its operations are more susceptible to the budgetary whims of the company. Cable companies
also tend to allow less community control over program content and facilities than other types
of management." R. ORINOEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 15.
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local government, 335 such as the public library33 6 or a state university; 37 and
3) nonprofit access management corporations.3" The cable operator, as access
manager, is explicitly forbidden to exercise content control under the 1984
Cable Act. 39 The local government and its agencies are prohibited from
exercising editorial control over access programming under the first amend-
ment and implicitly under the 1984 Cable Act. 40 Whether nonprofit access
managers are "state actors" presents a different, and more difficult dilemma.
To satisfy the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has required that the conduct depriving the federal right be
fairly attributable to the State.3 4' The Court's state action decisions have
produced a two-part test to analyze the concept of "fair attribution. "- 2 The
335. The disadvantages of municipal access management include the "danger that access
staff will be hired for their political connections instead of their qualifications, and that the
center will be used for political propaganda rather than kept at a needed arm's-length from
the political machinations of members of local government." R. ORmnrEL & S. BusKE, supra
note 9, at 15. See also NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 26 (public access in Pocatello was
controlled by the city council and was thus vulnerable to political pressure).
336. For descriptions of library involvement in access, see Boyle, A Public Library Video
Success Story... PACT Comes to Paterson, LmR. J., Oct. 15, 1980, at 2159; Smith, Library
Clout in Local Cable, Ax4. LmaR., Sept. 1981, at 500; Community Access Cable TV for Wyoming
Residents, AM. LmR., Dec. 1973, at 661.
337. In Springfield, Illinois, for example, the public access channel is managed and operated
by Sangamon State University. Sangamon State University/Times Mirror Cable Television of
Springfield, Inc. Access Rules § I (Springfield, Illinois, undated).
338. See R. ORINGEL & S. BusKE, supra note 9, at 14; Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at
53-54, NIAPV REPOORT, supra note 27, at 6.7.
Nonprofit access management corporations, unlike the cable company and the local govern-
ment, are most likely to promote the use of public access channels. Nonprofit access managers
are insulated from the political pressures felt by municipal access managers and from the
budgetary whims felt by cable company access managers. R. Owmosi. & S. BUSKE, supra note
9, at 27. Nonetheless, nonprofit corporations are prone to exercise editorial control over
controversial programming, and are vulnerable to the dictates of the local government which
fund them. Id. at 134-35. A nonprofit access management corporation is similar to the entity
a franchising authority must create when the government owns the cable system.
339. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 314-22 and accompanying text.
341. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
342. Id. Justice White's majority opinion in Lugar was the first attempt to fashion a test
from prior state action cases.
Descriptions of the Court's prior "state action" decisions range from a "conceptual disaster
area," Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 69, 95 (1967), to "composed entirely of
malleable concepts, contractable and expandable depending on how' the judge feels ... pi-
geonholes and labels." Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 320 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
Justice White's test merely compiles the holdings of the Court's prior state action cases.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 926-42. Although his two-part test may add some lucidity to state action
by organizing past cases into two categories, the test is not very precise and may be quite
abstract and vague. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28
ST. Louis U.L.J. 683, 720 n.190, 735 n.264 (1984). Justice White's test was applied in Albert
v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1339 (2d Cir. 1987).
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first part of the test focuses on the relationship between the state and the
actor.141 The second part focuses on the character of the actor.3 "
Under the first part, to constitute state action the "deprivation must be
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by
a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State
is responsible.'"145 Therefore, the state policies or regulations that create the
relationship between the state and the alleged state actor must connect with
the actor's conduct which deprived the putative plaintiff of a federal right. 46
In the case of the nonprofit access management corporation, the basis of
its relationship with the state is two-fold. First, the franchising authority
specifically creates the nonprofit access management corporation for the sole
purpose of supervising the access facilities the franchising authority required
the cable operator to provide under the 1984 Cable Act. 4 7 Any regulation
343. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Accord West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988) (§ 1983
case).
344. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
345. Id. at 937.
346. Id. at 938; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (requiring
sufficiently close tie between state and challenged action of regulated entity so that action of
latter may be fairly attributed to state). See also West, 108 S. Ct. at 2259 (state action for
§ 1983 claim found where state contracted out for prison medical care-"dispositive issue
concerns the relationship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner"); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (no state action in nursing home's discharge or transfer of patients
to lower levels of care without adequate notice where only connection between state and nursing
home was the adjustment of benefits); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972)
(no state action in racially discriminatory policies of private club where only connection between
state and club was issuance of liquor license).
347. See Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 57. Under the 1984 Cable Act, if the nonprofit
access corporation exercises editorial control over access programming, the corporation may
become a "cable programmer" subject to any civil or criminal liability arising from the
programming. See supra note 221.
It is not clear whether Congress intended a nonprofit access management corporation created
pursuant to § 533(e)(2) of the 1984 Cable Act to be a state actor. See supra notes 321-22 and
accompanying text. Congress included this provision to alleviate its fears of government
censorship in cable systems owned by the government. This delegation of editorial control
responsibility would seem to indicate that the nonprofit access management corporation would
not be a state actor. To bolster this argument, an analogy can be drawn to the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting ("CPB"). The goals of the CPB are "to facilitate the development of
educational broadcasting, to assist in the development of systems of interconnection for the
distribution of educational television programs and to aid in the establishment of systems of
public television stations." Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2399, 2401 (D.D.C. 1979). Congress' intent in establishing the CPB were similar
to that in promulgating § 533(e)(2) of the 1984 Cable Act:
Congress desired to establish a program funding agency which would be free from
governmental influence or control in its operation. Yet, the lawmakers feared that
such complete autonomy might lead to biases and abuses of its own. The unique
position of the Corporation is the synthesis of these competing influences. Reference
to the legislative history of the 1967 Act shows a deep concern that governmental
regulation or control over the Corporation might turn the CPB into a Governmental
spokesman. Congress thus sought to insulate CPB by removing its programming
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of access programming content by the nonprofit access management cor-
poration would be compelled by the access rules and regulations promulgated
by the governmental franchise authority. Second, the local government or
the franchising authority usually nominates, appoints, or confirms the non-
profit access management corporation's board of directors . 4  Due to the
close relationship between the state and the nonprofit access management
corporation, any claim of first amendment deprivation based on the access
manager's exercise of editorial control over access programming would surely
be imputed to the state. But for the franchising authority's access require-
ments and its concomitant access rules and procedures, the nonprofit access
management corporation would not exist. Therefore, under the first-part of
the Supreme Court's state action analysis, the nonprofit access manager
constitutes a state actor while performing access-related duties.
The second part of the Supreme Court's two-part state action analysis
focuses on the character of the purported state actor. 49 The purported state
activity from governmental supervision.
Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. F.C.C., 521 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Network Project,
public television viewers and program producers alleged that the CPB censored the content of
public television, eliminated funding for controversial programs, and required detailed descrip-
tions of program content as a condition of funding. 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2401. Relying
primarily on the degree of insulation between the government and the CPB as provided in the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 stat. 365 (1967), the court held that
the CPB was not a state actor. Id. at 2403-08. But cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 418 U.S. 94, 149 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas reasoned
that:
since [the CPB] is a creature of Congress whose management is in the hands of a
Board named by the President and approved by the Senate, it is difficult to see
why it is not a federal agency engaged in operating a 'press' as that word is used
in the First Amendment. If these cases involved [the CPB], we would have a
situation comparable to that in which the United States owns and manages a
prestigious newspaper .... The Government as owner and manager would not, as
I see it, be free to pick and choose such news items as it desired.
Id.
The provisions in section 533(e)(2) may be distinguished from the CPB for state action
purposes. Section 533(e)(2) access managers are still compelled to enforce the access rules and
regulations promulgated by the franchising authority. The House Report suggests that the access
manager's only discretion is selecting programming services, and not exercising control over
access. H.R. RPp. 934, supra note 7, at 68-69, reprinted in USCCAN, at 4705-06. It would
also be inequitable for an access manager in a community with a privately-owned cable system
to get less protection than a neighboring community with a publicly-owned system simply
because of the ownership configuration. Lastly, as discussed in supra notes 324-25, the CPB's
active involvement in funding is distinguished from the passive managerial duties relating to
public access channels.
348. Id. See, e.g., Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 593
(W.D. Pa. 1987) (access channels controlled by seven member Board of Managers, of whom
five are appointed by Erie City Council); By-Laws of Comm. Access Corp., Inc., Lansing,
Michigan Art. IV, § 2 (Lansing, Michigan, undated) (nine directors nominated by cable operator
and confirmed by the Lansing City Council).
349. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 938.
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actor must be a state official, have acted with or obtained significant aid
from state officials, or otherwise have his conduct fairly chargeable to the
state. -0 Three significant characteristics of a nonprofit access management
corporation make its conduct fairly chargeable to the state. First, where the
private entity exercises powers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the State," the entity becomes a state actor under "public function"
doctrine." ' Assuming arguendo that public access channels are a limited
public forum,"12 any exercise of editorial control over the content of pro-
gramming would clearly be a power traditionally exercised by the state. 353
For example, it would clearly be impermissible for a local government to
delegate its duties over streets, parks, and sidewalks to a private party in
order to avoid constitutional dictates.
The second characteristic that transforms the nonprofit access management
corporation into a state actor is the manner in which the corporation is
funded and the level of that funding.33 4 Nonprofit access managers receive
funding almost exclusively from municipal governments, either directly or
indirectly.3" Apparently the level of government funding is significant enough
350. Id. at 937 (person must fairly be said to be state actor "because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or
because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State."). Accord West, 108 S. Ct. at 2255
(§ 1983 case). This prong of the analysis encompasses a variety of other "state action" tests,
including "the 'public function' test, the 'state compulsion' test, the 'nexus' test, and . . . a
'joint action test."' Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (citations omitted). See also Blum, 457 U.S. at
1004 (state held responsible for private decision when state overtly or covertly encouraged or
coerced private actor) (citations omitted).
351. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). See also Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private entity became state actor when it exercised power over electoral
processes); Marsh v. State of Ala., 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (owner of company town became state
actor when it restricted dissemination of information on town streets).
352. See supra notes 285-331 and accompanying text.
353. Meyerson, Coaxial Wires, supra note 166, at 585 (the 1984 Cable Act regards access
channels as "the modern counterpart to the city streets or, perhaps more precisely, to the
streets in a company town") (emphasis added).
354. Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that governmental funding, without more, may
be insufficient to establish state action. Phillips, supra note 342, at 719. See, e.g., San Francisco
Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (United States
Olympic Committee is not governmental actor); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)
(no state action where public funds accounted for between 90% and 99% of entity's budget);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) ("[tihat programs undertaken by the State result
in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact
of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made
by the entity in the course of its business").
In the case of a nonprofit access management corporation, however, the claim of state action
may also rest on the manner of funding. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
355. Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 57. See, e.g., 1987 Annual Report Cable 21-
ACTV: The Community Channel (Columbus, Ohio, June 1988) (ACTV Cable 21 partially
funded by City of Columbus through the cable television franchise fees); Milwaukee Access
Telecommunications Authority: Fact Sheet (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, undated) (1987 operating
budget of $577,000 through franchise fees). These corporations may also receive funding from
arts foundations.
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that one commentator noted that the most pervasive threat to access pro-
grammers' first amendment rights is the governmental influence over access
organizations "by political and budgetary pressure.' '11 6
Finally, editorial control exercised by a nonprofit access management
corporation constitutes state activity because such action is not essentially a
private function."17 The private function doctrine-which also focuses on the
entity's characteristics-"effectively deconstitutionalize[s] formally public ac-
tivity because of its functional resemblance to private behavior.""38 Unlike
the public defender in Polk County, the school in Rendell-Baker, or the
nursing home in Blum, an access manager has no equivalent in the private
sector. But for statutory provisions, public access channels would not exist.
Therefore, because of the large amount of state aid, 59 the state's significant
overt and covert influence3'0 over the decisions of the nonprofit access
management corporation, and the lack of a private function nature, such
356. R. OINGaEL & S. Busi.a, supra note 9, at 133. See supra note 268 for examples of
governmental budgetary influence over access managers and channel content.
The F.C.C. in 1975 reached a similar conclusion. See In re Open Channel, 58 F.C.C.2d 1216
(1975). A group which assisted individuals in producing access programs in New York City
asked the F.C.C. to approve a rule allowing cable systems to fulfill their access obligations by
contributing toward the funding of a "separate community entity designed to effectuate the
production of public access programming." Id. at 1216. The F.C.C. declined the request:
[W]e cannot ignore the potential for either direct or indirect control over the content
of public access programming by any arm of government involved in administering
or financing public access arrangements. It is of grave concern to us that in devising
a public access arrangement, in disbursing funds, or In overseeing the operation of
an allegedly separate public access organization, the franchising authority may
influence the choice of speakers or the views expressed on cable television public
access channels.
Id. at 1218.
The F.C.C. would allow such arrangements "only in the most extraordinary circumstances,
and only when a specific showing is made that the proposal contains sufficient safeguards
against direct or indirect government censorship." Id. at 1219. See, e.g., In re Application of
Complete Channel TV, Inc., 34 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1372 (1975) (allowed access facilities to
be funded partially by local government only with assurance that government would exercise
no editorial control over programming). Although such arrangements are commonplace today,
the warning sounded by the F.C.C. still applies.
357. The private function doctrine was first enunciated in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312 (1981). There, the Court held that a public defender was not a state actor because the
defender performs an "essentially private function." Id. at 319. "[A) public defender does not
act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional function as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 325. See also Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41
("The school is also analogous to the public defender found not to be a state actor in Polk
County v. Dodson,... [hiere the relationship between the school and its teachers and counselors
is not changed because the State pays the tuition of the students."); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011-
12 (nursing home held not to be state actor).
358. Phillips, supra note 342, at 710.
359. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
360. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1104.
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corporations satisfy the state action requirements under the second part of
the Supreme Court analysis."'
The conclusion that nonprofit access management corporations are state
actors can also be justified by exploring two underlying themes in the Court's
recent opinions which have effectively narrowed the scope of state action.
The first theme, which is closely related to the private function doctrine, is
the Court's recent solicitude for business interests in its state action cases. 62
These recent cases evince a concern for the organizational autonomy of the
entity, "especially as this manifests itself in solidified control over employees,
members, or third parties.'" 63 Declaring nonprofit access managers state
actors for purposes of exercising content control over access programming
does not impinge the entity's duties as an employer. The related second
theme suggested by recent cases is the notion that the state action standard
will vary depending on the constitutional right allegedly violated.3" Early
state action opinions usually included claims of racial discrimination,3 65 and
the doctrine was expansively interpreted in these cases. Today those claims
are not as common. Most of the recent pro-business state action decisions
involve due process claims and have triggered a narrower interpretation of
the doctrine.3" For public access purposes, the constitutional claim at issue
is a first amendment claim. Although a first amendment claim may not
generate the same level of scrutiny as one of racial discrimination, it surely
will not be dismissed as quickly as a due process claim and, therefore, a
more expansive view of the state action doctrine should apply.3 67 "
361. One commentator has asserted that the nonprofit access management corporation con-
stitutes an actual governmental entity. Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 57.
Federal income tax laws governing nonprofit corporations may also prohibit a nonprofit
access manager from exercising content control over access shows. R. ORWOEL & S. BusKE,
supra note 9, at 26-27. Nonprofit organizations must not "propagandize ... to influence
legislation . . ., participate in or intervene in any political campaign . . ., or be organized or
operated for the benefit of private interests." Id.
362. Phillips, supra note 342, at 739 (cases cited therein).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 740.
365. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But see Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
366. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
As Justice Marshall noted in Jackson, a due process case, the singular state action standard
applied by the majority "would seemingly apply as well to a company that refused to extend
service to Negroes, welfare recipients, or any other group that the company preferred, for its
own reasons, not to serve." 419 U.S. at 374.
367. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (striking down state ban on distributing
religious literature). But see San Francisco Arts and Athletics, 483 U.S. at 522 (no state action
where commercial speech affected); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1988) (no
state action in first amendment case due to lack of nexus between state control over entity and
entity's decision to discharge plaintiff).
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III. COUNTER-PROGRAMMING AND SCHEDULING AS A RESPONSE TO
CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMMING
The community has three options to combat controversial programming
on public access channels: 1) challenge the first amendment protection of
the controversial speech; 2) eliminate public access entirely; or 3) use public
access to promote its own positive ideals.3 ' Short of attacking the first
amendment protection of controversial expression or pulling the plug on
public access channels, what options are available to the franchising authority
and access manager to respond to controversial programming? To date,
franchising authorities and access managers have employed two methods of
attack: counter-programming and scheduling.
Counter-programming is the active solicitation by access managers of
programming that responds to the message of a particular controversial show
or programmer. Scheduling is the manipulation of the sequencing of public
access programs in an effort to surround controversial programs with re-
sponsive counter-programming. Both methods are designed to minimize the
impact of the controversial message. Access managers that use counter-
programming and scheduling do so without clear standards or guidelines?' 9
368. NIAPV REPORT, supra note 27, at 23. The NIAPV Report stated:
three options open to [thel community are First, we can challenge the protection
of [the] speech under the First Amendment. Second, we can seek to silence the
[speech] by attempting to eliminate public access altogether. Our third option is to
learn how to use this powerful medium, not only to combat [controversiall cable
programs, but to promote our own positive goals ....
Id.
The first two options will not be reviewed here. However, for a review of the second option
of pulling the plug on public access channels, see supra note 235 and accompanying text for a
description of one city's experience. "Silencing the bigot is also dangerous because it misleads
us into believing we have thereby dealt with the racism, when we have not. The bigot and his
racism simply become more difficult to identify and expose for what they are." NIAPV REPORT,
supra note 27, at 23.
In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the court held that the first amendment is
designed to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, allowing the
public to decide which views shall be voiced, so that such freedom will produce a more capable
citizenry and a more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the political system's premise of individual dignity and choice. Id. at 24. In Terminiello
v. City of Chicago Justice Jackson quoted President Woodrow Wilson:
I have always been among those who believed that the greatest freedom of speech
was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to
encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered
if you allow him to remain silent and look wise, but if you let him speak, the secret
is out and the world knows that he is a fool. So it is by exposure of folly that it
is defeated; not by the seclusion of folly ....
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
369. Some access managers have attempted to codify these methods in their access rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1984 Cable Act. Other systems which have access rules
and regulations utilize counter-programming and scheduling on a case-by-case basis. Finally,
some systems have no written access rules and regulations at all. Telephone interview with
Capital Cablevision, Charleston, West Virginia (September 19, 1988); telephone interview with
official of Rockford Cablevision, Rockford, Illinois (September 19, 1988).
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Therefore, access managers exercise extensive discretion in determining whether
a program is controversial370 and whether to utilize counter-programming or
scheduling to respond to it.17'
Both counter-programming and scheduling are content-based activities.
Such efforts are content-based because they are triggered solely by the
perceived controversial nature of the program or programmer. The Court
has not viewed favorably attempts to minimize the impact of one viewpoint
by elevating the persuasive appeal of another.3 2 Furthermore, there is no
evidence that controversial programming exerts any undue influence on
viewers or denies viewers exposure to other programming373-these are actions
designed to protect the majority from a minority viewpoint.3 74 Because
counter-programming and scheduling are content-based, in order to be con-
sidered constitutionally sound under the applicable public forum doctrine,
370. See supra notes 253-62 and accompanying text for review of special protection contro-
versial speech receives from the first amendment. See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, (1988) ('Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors'
tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression."); Stewart
v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (large banner posted in
Washington D.C.'s Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadiusp reading "John 3:16-For God so
loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in Him shall not
perish, but have everlasting Life"-removed due to its controversiality).
371. Such discretion may run afoul of the Constitution. See, e.g., Niemotko v. State of Md.,
340 U.S. 268 (1951) (lack of standards for city park use permits violates due process).
372. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978) (legislature's
suppression of speech which provides one side of debatable public question advantage offends
first amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . ."); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. F.C.C., 629 F.2d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Tamm, J., concurring) (regulation must guard
against government action that tends to enhance persuasive appeal of particular speaker or
viewpoint), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
373. See also Krattenmaker & Powe, Television Violence: First Amendment Principles and
Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. Rav. 1123, 1274 (197A) (regulation which restricts amount of
violent programs "might pass constitutional muster if its proponents could show that the public
is being denied exposure to other types of programs and that limiting the amount of existing
programs would further the public interest by ensuring a wider variety of viewing options");
cf. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90 (no showing that voice of corporations has been overwhelming
or significant in influencing Massachusetts referenda; no finding that confidence of citizenry in
government is threatened).
374. "Everything else on television is counter-programming to Gay Cable Network access
programming." Telephone interview with Louis Maletta, president, Gay Cable Network (August
29, 1988).
Such restrictions also limit the access of minority or unpopular groups to mass media, an
institution to which they are already excluded. Cf. Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v.
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 661 (1974) (court rejected university decision to bar gay rights group
from access to university facilities, stating "[i]t would seem that these communicative oppor-
tunities are even more important for [the gays] than political teas, coffees, and dinners are for
political candidates and parties, who have much wider access to the media, being more highly
organized and socially acceptable").
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these activities must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
A. Counter-Programming
Counter-programming may take one of two forms. First, the franchising
authority itself may produce the counter-programming.3" Second, and more
common, the franchising authority may solicit a third party to produce
counter-programming.37 6 One community that has attempted to codify a
counter-programming policy is Columbus, Ohio."7 Under its regulations, the
nonprofit access management corporation pre-screens any programs which
a city board member or member of the public brings to the attention of the
board which is purported to contain material which a substantial number of
access viewers may find offensive . 7 After reviewing the program, the board
may:
a. direct the staff to schedule and show the program according to the
regular rules of [the operator] ... ;
b. direct that the showing of the program be preceded by a warning notice;
c. direct that the program be shown at night only with or without a
warning; and
d. design a plan to solicit appropriate responsive programming from the
community, and direct the staff to make assistance of the responsive
programming a priority."'
The governmental interest in counter-programming may be a desire to be
fair or to present a balanced view of a topic. These interests would be similar
to the interests advanced by the fairness doctrine in the broadcasting field,
which requires a broadcast licensee to air both sides of a controversial topic
of public importance.8 0 The fairness doctrine was premised on the limited
availability of broadcast frequencies and the concomitant need for govern-
mental licensing.38' However, when the F.C.C. controlled access, it did not
375. This was an option that Pocatelo, Idaho, rejected when confronted with "Race and
Reason." See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
376. This was the option utilized by the communities discussed in supra notes 243-50 and
accompanying text.
377. Scheduling Regulations, Cable 21-ACTV" The Community Channel (Columbus, Ohio,
Feb. 12, 1986).
378. Id. § 7.04(b). Potentially offensive programming includes "those which might be con-
sidered obscene, or slanderous or which portray or advocate violence or hatred toward any
societal group." Id.
379. Id. § 7.04(c)(2).
380. For a brief description of the fairness doctrine requirements see infra notes 257-59 and
accompanying text.
381. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969) ("If 100 persons
want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the
same 'right' to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a
few can be licensed and the rest must be barred from the airwaves."); In re Fairness Doctrine
(§ 73.1910), 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146-47 (1985) (discusses bases for fairness doctrine); Simmons,
supra note 147, at 629 (discusses bases for fairness doctrine).
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apply the fairness doctrine to access channels because, unlike broadcasting,
access was available to everyone free of charge." 2 Governmental regulation
of fairness and balance is inapplicable to a public forum which is indiscrim-
inately open to the general public. 83
Another flaw in the counter-programming concept is its discriminatory
effect on minority or unpopular speakers. As subsection (d) of the Columbus,
Ohio, counter-programming regulation suggests, the access manager may be
directed to offer facilities, funds and the assistance of access personnel to
one group without offering these same services to the minority or unpopular
group. 38' For example, the access manager would make special efforts to
assist the NAACP in developing a counter-program to the white-suprem-
acists, but it is unlikely that the access manager would offer the Klan
assistance to counter-program the NAACP. Promoting counter-programming
is permissible and should be encouraged in the overall scheme of public
access. However, counter-programming actively solicited by the access man-
ager and the discriminatory provision of access services to favored groups
is impermissible.' This programming is the result of the artificial forces of
the access manager and franchising authority. Conversely, counter-program-
ming whose impetus comes from the community and which is the natural
product of generally applied access education and training is permissible and
desirable.
The use of counter-programming presents still another problem. Assuming
that this action effectively constitutes editorial control by the access manager,
382. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. The Columbus, Ohio, regulations recognize
the inapplicability of the fairness doctrine to access programming, but nevertheless allow the
access manager to "make an effort to provide for fair and balanced programming throughout
its entire program schedule." Scheduling Regulations, Cable 21-ACTV: The Community
Channel § 3.05(d) (Columbus, Ohio, Feb. 12, 1986).
383. See Krattenmaker & Power, supra note 373, at 1273-74 (1978). The authors reject an
effort to require broadcasters to reduce the number of violent programs and present a more
"balanced" programming menu, noting that (1) the fairness requirement in broadcasting rests
wholly upon the medium's scarcity, and (2) the government "lacks power to compel speakers
using traditional media-whether in the parks, on the streets, or in newspapers-to balance the
views they express" id.; cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 145-46 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). In rejecting a general right of access to broadcast
advertising time, Justice Stewart noted that the Framers of the constitution "believed that
'fairness' was far too fragile to be left for a Government bureaucracy to accomplish. History
has many times confirmed the wisdom of their choice." Id. But cf. Bonner-Lyons v. School
Comm. of City of Boston, 480 F.2d 442, 444 (1st Cir. 1973) (declared internal distribution
system of school a limited public forum, and enjoined the further distribution of anti-bussing
material "unless fair and reasonable [sic] timely opportunity is afforded to others having
differing views to use the same channels").
384. See R. OMNCML & S. Busic, supra note 9, at 132 (notes problem when "[flacilities are
... made available to one community group, without requiring [the access manager] to work
with other members of the community").
385. Van Eaton & Earley, supra note 218, at 13.
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and that manager is a state actor, these activities constitute indirect control
of expression by the government or "governmental speech." 386 Governmental
speech is perceived as dangerous because "participation by the government
in the dissemination of political ideas poses a threat to open public debate
that is distinct from government impairment of individual liberty."3 , As
one commentator put it, "[s]tudents of the Constitution debate endlessly
over whether Nazis may march in a Jewish neighborhood, but virtually
ignore the march of government, an immensely more powerful communicator
than a small group of malcontents." 3 ' The government could nullify the
effectiveness of criticism by using the vast wealth of resources at its dis-
posal. 89 By skewing public debate, governmental speech also has the potential
to "destroy the underpinnings of government by consent." 39" By drowning
out the voice of dissent, this brand of speech may result in intellectual and
social uniformity.39' Indeed, the government may employ a friendly press,
committed to views favorable to its own, to curtail the activities of those
with critical opinions.9 2 In the realm of public access, the danger of gov-
ernmental speech is manifested by the access manager who utilizes counter-
programming illegitimately to further the propoganda of the prevailing
government and simultaneously drown out of the voice of dissent. 93
386. For commentaries on the topic, see Emerson & Haber, The Scopes Case in Modern
Dress, 27 U. Cmc. L. Rav. 522 (1960); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CAin. L. Rv. 1104 (1979); Meister, Journalistic Silence and Gov-
ernmental Speech: Can Institutions Have Rights?, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319 (1981);
Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the
United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROaS. 530 (1966); Yudof, When
Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment,
57 Tax. L. REv. 863 (1979); Comment, Unconstitutional Government Speech, 15 SAN Dm0o
L. R-v. 815 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum
Campaigns, 93 HAtv. L. REv. 535 (1980).
387. Kamenshine, supra note 386, at 1104. Some commentators do not agree that govern.
mental speech is a constitutional problem. See, e.g., L. TRmE, AmEiucAN Comsna'rtinoKA LAw
588-91 (1978) (no constitutional provision means that "government cannot add its own voice
to the many that it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication.");
Emerson, Legal Foundation of the Right to Know, 1976 WMH. U.L.Q. 1, 7 ("The government
of course is entitled to participate in the system of freedom of expression and, while its
contribution may at times tend to drown out others, no constitutional objection can normally
be entered.").
388. Yudof, supra note 386, at 864.
389. Kamenshine, supra note 386, at 1104.
390. Id. at 1105 (government must be restrained from manipulating free marketplace of
political ideas if self-government is to be preserved).
391. See Emerson & Haber, supra note 386, at 522; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 386,
at 532-33 (government may seek to suppress "expression of ideas inimical to their interests");
Yudof, supra note 386, at 873 (government may "silence the strong or critical voices").
392. Van Alstyne, supra note 386, at 532-33.
393. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1942) ("Struggles
to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and
country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men.").
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B. Scheduling
Another tool franchising authorities and access managers use to respond
to controversial programming is scheduling. The first-come, first-served
formula of public access does not offer any guidance as to whether an access
manager can schedule programming. 94 A literal interpretation of first-come,
first-served suggests that programs should be scheduled and cablecast in the
order access producers submit them. Therefore, based on the first-come,
first-served concept and the limited public forum nature of access, scheduling
of public access programming constitutes impermissible editorial control
under the 1984 Cable Act.3 9
Some access managers schedule counter-programming, whether solicited
by the access manager or not, before and/or after the controversial program
in an effort to minimize the program's impact. 396 Surrounding the contro-
versial program with counter-programming diminishes the persuasive appeal
of the message. Governmental attempts to alter the viewer's reaction to
394. See Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1057 (question arises "how any 'scheduling'
could be done, of programs unknown to and under no control" of the access manager); D.
OTHmER, supra note 61, at 32 (public access cannot be system-analyzed or preprogrammed);
LaPierre, supra note 144, at 103 (discusses ambiguities in first-come, first-served dictate).
395. See Meyerson, Rights, supra note 146, at 61 ("there is no 'journalistic discretion'
involved in running a public access system; each individual access programmer exercises 'jour-
nalistic discretion."'). See generally Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 373, at 1270 (scheduling
inconsistent with basic principle of time, place, and manner cases because it is content-related).
Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("[tjhe choice of
material to go into a newspaper, and decisions made as to limitations on the size and content
of the paper, are treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-
constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment."); Columbia Broadcasting System,
412 U.S. at 124 ("[flor better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection
and choice of material."); Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("[a] law allowing free expression in public parks only for a few minutes at 6 a.m.
hardly provides an adequate replacement for the right to free, untrammeled debate in that
forum."), aff'd on narrower grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Nadel, Editorial Freedom, supra
note 179, at 232 (organizing of material is part of editorial discretion).
396. Communities confronted with "Race and Reason" have used the "scheduling" of
counter-programming to respond to its message. This practice was condoned by the F.C.C., In
re Obscene or Indecent Matter on Access Channels, 59 F.C.C.2d 984, 985 (1976) ("[Als a
matter of taste and common sense it would be appropriate for [offensive] programming to be
cablecast at hours that would tend to minimize its exposure to children. Our rules do not
require such scheduling, but we wish to make clear that neither do they prohibit it."), and is
advocated by some commentators. E.g., R. ORINOEL & S. BusKc, supra note 9, at 30 ("[ut is
important that your access group does not waste the many hours that some community access
groups have wasted by agonizing over rules to control a situation that may never occur, or if
it does, can be managed by judicious scheduling.") (emphasis added).
In other media, scheduling is used to enhance the persuasive effect of certain messages. Cf.
In re Revocation of the Licenses of Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 43 F.C.C.2d 730, 733
(1973) (in reviewing broadcaster's decision to refuse to air a candidate's political ad immediately
after his opponent's ad, the F.C.C. noted that the "policy of requiring a minimum separation
between announcements of opposing candidates was adopted to assure that each announcement
would have maximum effect").
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controversial expression are impermissible. 97 However, scheduling is often
justified as an attempt to build a regular public access viewership. 3" In fact,
one set of access rules has a provision that explicitly lists "building a regular
viewership" as a "high priority."' ' This type of scheduling, similar to the
scheduling performed on broadcast television, is done to make access channel
programming more accessible to viewers.4 Public access, however, was not
meant to be a step-child of broadcasting. Judging by the program offerings
on broadcast stations, 40' it is questionable whether we want more. Given
society's interest in the discussion of controversial issues, styling public access
after broadcast would be ill-advised. The fairness doctrine,4 advertisers,u4
397. See Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1163 (suggesting that protecting listener's reaction to speech is
impermissible).
398. The dilemma between audience-building and the first-come, first-served formula has
been described as: "is]hould access emphasize simply getting people on the air, or should some
flexibility be sacrificed to accommodate the audience?" R. KEBrTER, supra note 47, at 12.
399. Cable Access.St. Paul, Inc. Rules and Regulations Art. IX(K)(3) (St. Paul, Minn.,
Apr. 8, 1986). The rules provide that scheduling will be done "on a priority basis ... within
the parameters of overall program composition and flow, considerations of audience building,
constraints of schedule building with regard to series, live feeds and special events, and the
representative diversity of programming on the [access] channels." Id. Art. IX(A)(I).
400. One commentator has stated:
Broadcast programs appear ... in regular scheduled spots, or as specials at times
scheduled regularly for specials. Audiences build up viewing habits based on these
patterns. Vary a show's day and time from week to week and its audience share
will plummet. Time-slot programming serves economic rather that aesthetic pur-
poses. Timing on cable need not be as rigid as for broadcasting, but regular
scheduling is very much a part of building an audience.
R. KLsTTER, supra note 47, at 11.
401. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
403. See generally Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
Iln light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audiences, and
therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters
to produce the variety and controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full
spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers
and, in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad business'
to espouse-or even to allow others to espouse-the heterodox or the controversial.
Id.
One commentator supports this view:
Network managers, on behalf of mass-circulation advertisers and advertising agen-
cies, provide programming best calculated to sell mass-consumer goods. Programs
on controversial issues do not attract the maximum audience and do not create the
atmosphere for effective salesmanship. In the absence of regulation, Gresham's Law
operates in broadcasting to drive out programs on controversial issues and to bring
in mass appeal entertainment programming.
Barrow, Program Regulation, supra note 147, at 524-25. See also M. HAwBuRo, supra note 8,
§ 6.43 (examples of sponsors withdrawing support for shows whose controversiality endangered
sponsor's commercial success).
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and the implicit coercion of the government4 have had an adverse impact
on the free flow of expression eminating from broadcast television. Fur-
thermore, the government's deliberate scheduling of expression at a public
forum, without the speaker's cooperation, is clearly impermissible. There-
fore, utilizing the scheduling of access programming to build viewership,
with a secondary motive to minimize the effect of controversial programming,
is not a constitutionally sound practice.
The type of scheduling presently performed by access managers to "an-
swer" controversial access programming is more stringent and intrusive than
permitted under either the fairness doctrine or the personal attack doctrine,
both of which are applicable to broadcast television. The focus under both
doctrines is to represent both sides of an issue fairly. Under the fairness
doctrine, the broadcast licensee can satisfy his obligation to discuss both
sides of a controversial issue in his "overall pattern of broadcast service." 4s
Rarely does the licensee present both sides of a controversial issue back-to-
back.
Under the stricter personal attack doctrine,4 if the broadcaster, during
the presentation of a controversial issue of public importance, attacks the
honesty, character, integrity, or personal qualities of an identified person or
group, the attacked person or group is allowed responsive air time. The
broadcaster must provide the attacked person or group with notification of
the date and time of the broadcast, a script or tape of the attack, and an
offer to respond. Therefore, similar to the fairness doctrine, the airing of a
response under the personal attack doctrine might not occur until days or
weeks after the attack.
Conversely, the scheduling of counter-programming by access managers is
used to surround the controversial access program with counter-programming
to minimize its impact. Such scheduling does not enhance the fair represen-
tation of issues because scheduling is used to restrict minority viewpoints
through the programming of majority viewpoints which are more than
represented by other access programs and other media. This type of sched-
404. There are many instances of the broadcast media being "captured" by the government
on which they report. See Van Alstyne, supra note 386, at 542 n.38 (notes "[t]he faithfulness
of the private press in relaying, amplifying, and reciprocating the government's own propa-
ganda"). See also Minniberg, supra note 50, at 589 (cites report that notes government's power
over mass media; "[mlore than 20,000 persons are employed in government public relations, a
system which 'arranges tours, sets up exhibits, sponsors aerial events, schedules speakers, offers
press interviews and press briefings, [and] transmits radio programs around the world').
405. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949). See Barrow,
Program Regulation, supra note 147, at 523-24 ("[t]he differing points of view need not be
presented at the same time, but may be presented in the broadcaster's overall program service.");
Simmons, supra note 147, at 631, 653 (response to controversial program could be aired in
mid-afternoon of following week, thereby minimizing response's effectiveness).
406. See Personal Attack Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1984); Galloway v. F.C.C., 778 F.2d
16, 18 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (component of fairness doctrine that requires licensees to provide notice
and other protections).
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uling is more intrusive than the procedure under the two broadcast doctrines
because under the broadcast model, the controversial program is allowed to
stand on its own with its message undiluted. This comparison points up the
content-impact of this technique and further demonstrates the impermis-
sability of the current use of scheduling by access managers to answer
controversial programming.
IV. RECOMMNDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Public access channels have been and continue to be a forum for unhin-
dered expression, thus providing ordinary citizens with an opportunity to
speak through a meduim traditionally controlled by the government and
large media giants. However, societal fear of controversial racist ideas*' and
ignorance of the public access concept may promote increased regulation
which may ultimately allow the government and media giants to deprive us
of our only avenue to unrestricted television access. The regulation of this
new medium of expressidn in order to dilute the effect of controversial
programming presents many complex first amendment and societal problems.
While there may exist popular support for increased regulation, this "solu-
tion" does not eliminate racism and only hinders the free flow of expression
of others. Beyond the first amendment implications, it would be unfortunate
if society placed restrictions on the use of public access to "solve" a problem,
only to have those restrictions obstruct the growth of the medium. These
restrictions may result in public access programming becoming a step-child
of the bland, inoffensive fare offered by ad-supported broadcast channels.
Once a restriction is in place it is difficult to dislodge it later.
Controversial programming should be shown on the same basis as other
access programming. The use of counter-programming and scheduling to
dilute the impact of certain programs and groups is discriminatory because
it disadvantages the controversial message. 401 Counter-programming should
be encourgaged, but not spetifically targeted at one message or programmer.
Through education, counter-programming will develop naturally, rather than
artificially. A nondiscriminatory approach to controversial programming
comports with the goal of free flow of information, the 1984 Cable Act,
and most importantly, the first amendment.
Wally Mueller
407. See NIAPV REPoRT, supra note 27 (discusses three examples of problems caused by
racist programs on public access TV).
408. "[A] good rule of thumb ... may be to ask yourself whether the rule is directed to
solve a real problem, whether you are willing to apply it across the board (including yourself)
and whether the rule is a sensible solution to the problem which does not place certain users
at an undue advantage." Van Eaton & Early, supra note 218, at 13.
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